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Should the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
be read to shelter religiously motivated conduct from otherwise 
valid, generally applicable laws? There is general agreement, 
both on the Supreme Court and among commentators, that 
laws aimed at  religion-laws intentionally singling out a 
religious practice, or religion in general, for a burden or 
prohibition-are presumptively invalid under the First 
Amendment.' But what of laws which are not designed to 
affect religion; laws with recognized, legitimate governmental 
purposes which have the added consequence of impinging upon, 
burdening, or prohibiting religious conduct? Four examples 
from well-known cases illustrate the issue. 
First, consider Mrs. Frances Quaring, a Nebraska 
housewife who believed that the Second Commandment 
prohibited her from having her photograph taken or from 
carrying or using photographs ("graven images" from her 
perspective). The State of Nebraska, however, required that 
applicants for a driver's license have their photographs taken 
and affixed to the license and prohibited driving without a 
valid driver's license. Thus, by state law Mrs. Quaring was 
denied that  primary instrument of freedom and mobility in 
modem America-use of the automobile-because of her 
religious beliefs. Should we understand the Constitution's 
guaranty of freedom of religion as protecting Mrs. Quaring's 
mobility?2 
Next, consider the situations in which activities of specific 
religions have been criminally sanctioned. The Amish are 
bound by a religious command to "live separate and apart" 
1. Curiously, under modern doctrine it is the Establishment Clause which has 
been held to prohibit gover~lental action which intentionally or explicitly 
discriminates against religion or which discriminates among religions. See Larson v. 
Valente, 456 US. 228 (1982); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636-42 (1978) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 
15-16 (1947). With the decision this term in the Santeria animal sacrifice case, 
the Court has held that the Free Exercise Clause also prohibits laws which 
discriminate against religious conduct. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City 
of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). 
2. When the Supreme Court considered this case, it was unable to answer 
that question. The Eighth Circuit held that the state must issue Mrs. Quaring a 
license without a photo. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), afd 
by equally divided Court sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 US. 478 (1985) (per 
curiam, Powell, J., did not participate). 
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from mainstream society. They understand this as  a command 
from God which requires that  their children be raised "separate 
and apart." In turn, to the extent formal education is allowable 
at all, it must take place in small local schools and may not go 
beyond the eighth grade. Most states, however, have 
promulgated laws mandating universal education of all 
children up to the tenth grade. These laws were not targeted at 
the Amish, but they render criminal the religiously mandated 
conduct of the A m i ~ h . ~  
At one time in the history of the Mormon Church, 
polygamy was a religious duty for those members able to 
practice it. However, being married to more than one wife at a 
time was also the traditional crime of big am^.^ For many 
American Indians, the use of peyote is the central act in the 
religious practice of the Native American Church. However, in  
many states, use of peyote (along with many other powerful 
hallucinogenic drugs) is criminal under generally applicable, 
formally neutral laws.5 Except in the case of the Mormons, the 
government did not intentionally discriminate against or 
3. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Amish parents who refused to 
send their fourteen- and fifteen-year-old children to school after the eighth grade 
were convicted of violating the state's compulsory school attendance law. The 
Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause sheltered the Amish from 
criminal prosecution for this conduct. The Court has also held, to the contrary, 
that the Clause does not shelter the Amish in their belief that the mandate to live 
"separate and apart" requires that they neither contribute to nor receive benefits 
, from the Social Security system. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). Yoder 
is examined at some length in Stephen Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: 
Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 309, 333-45 
[hereinafter Pepper, Alternutives]; and I have discussed Lee in Stephen Pepper, The 
Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9 
N. KY. L. REV. 265, 299-302 (1982) [hereinafter Pepper, Conundrum]. These cases 
are also considered briefly infia part 1I.D. 
4. In the initial Supreme Court case dealing with the Free Exercise Clause, 
the bigamy conviction of a Mormon was upheld. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145 (1878). The opinion is described briefly infia part ED., and examined in some 
detail in Pepper, AZternutives, supra note 3, at 317-26. 
Although neutral in form, the legislation enforced in Reynolds may in fact have 
been targeted specifically at the Mormons. Orma Linford, The Mormons and the 
Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 UTAH L. REV. 308, 314-19 (1964). If so, it would now 
be considered presumptively invalid, and would be factually somewhat similar to 
the Hialeah case. See supra note 1. 
5. Sacramental usage of peyote by members of the Native American Church 
was held unprotected by the First Amendment in Employment Division v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Supreme Court's opinion is examined at  length in 
Douglas Laycock, T h  Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael 
W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1109 (1990). 
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burden these groups in their religious conduct; yet their 
members faced criminal conviction for following the tenets of 
their religion. 
In these situations religiously motivated conduct is either 
penalized or prohibited by laws which are not aimed at 
religion. Although the law in each case is religiously neutral in 
form and intent, religious believers may be burdened by the 
law's mandate in a way quite different from that law's effect on 
the rest of society. Should such situations be governed by a 
constitutional paradigm of equality, or a paradigm of liberty? 
William Marshall, a friend and a colleague in this symposium, 
argues that equality is the proper paradigm, and that formal 
equality, rather than substantive equality, should regulate.' 
According to  this view, it is unfair-and contrary to  the 
underlying logic of the First Amendment-to prefer religion as 
a basis for action over other beliefs that ground one's conduct. 
If the First Amendment prevents criminalization of the conduct 
only if it has a religious motivation, but allows governmentally 
imposed punishment or burden if the same conduct is 
otherwise motivated, religion has been preferred over other 
bases for action; and such a result is not constitutionally 
acceptable. 
The wrong or unfair aspect of this unequal treatment may 
be trivial in some instances and substantial in others. Aside 
from religious reasons such as Frances Quaring's, it is hard to 
imagine substantial prejudice or harm in being required t o  
have a photo on one's driver's license. It simply is not much of 
a burden. Peyote usage is usually a rather unpleasant and 
-cult experience. Although there are certainly some who 
wish t o  try it on the basis of non-religious reasons, either as a 
result of intellectual interest or  a sense of adventure, the 
burden of being prohibited from doing so does not seem great. 
6. William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free 
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1989-90) [hereinafter Marshall, 
The Case Against the Compelled Exemption]; William P. Marshall, Solving the Free 
Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Free Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983) 
[hereinafber Marshall, Free Exercise as Free Expression]; see also Ellis West, The 
Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 N ~ R E  DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. PoL'Y 591 (1990). A notion of substantive, as opposed to formal, equality may 
well lead to results quite different than those suggested by Marshall and West. See 
infia part IVA. 
Professor Marshall's contribution to this symposium discusses a different 
problem, although from a related perspective. William P. Marshall, The Inequality 
of Anti-establishment, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 63. 
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On the other hand, there are many people with substantial, 
strongly held, non-religious reasons for wanting to educate 
their children away from public or governmentally regulated 
schools. To allow only those with religious reasons to avoid the 
compulsory attendance law is a burden of a different order 
from the first two examples. Similarly, there are many with 
strong reasons for wanting a form of marriage not sanctioned 
by the state. Homosexual couples with long term marriage-like 
relationships are one example. To allow those with sincere 
religious reasons to avoid the laws concerning marriage while 
they remain applicable to all others appears to be a substantial 
wrong. 
The First Amendment contains a guaranty of the "free 
exercise" of religion.' Is religion singled out in the Amendment 
for special treatment or for equal treatment? Is freedom for the 
religious dissenter the essential purpose of the Free Exercise 
Clause, or is it equality between those acting upon religious 
motives and those acting upon other bases? In elaborating an 
answer to these questions, the discussion in Part I1 will 
canvass the major categories of constitutional discourse as 
bases for interpreting the Free Exercise Clause and provide a 
response to some of the related arguments of Professor 
Marshall. Parts I11 and IV will then turn to the basic 
interpretive choice presented by the issue of religiously based 
exemptions from neutral law, and to a few of the difficulties 
that must be faced in developing a vigorous free exercise 
doctrine based upon religious liberty. 
11. BASES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Constitutional interpretation occurs, for the most part, 
through argument which can be divided into five major 
categories: (1) text, (2) history, (3) structure and theory, (4) 
doctrine and precedent, and (5) prudence, social policy and 
ju s t i~e .~  These categories are interrelated, lack clear 
boundaries, and can each be subdivided into narrower aspects. 
The fifth category, in particular, is hard to define, capacious, 
and capable of being divided into numerous subcategories. 
These categories do provide, however, a useful path for analysis 
7. U.S.  CON^. amend. I. 
8. PHILIP BOBBITT, C O N ~ I O N A L  FATE, 3-119 (1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 mxJ. L. 
REV. 1189, 1189-209 (1987). 
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of the meaning of a constitutional provision. 
A. Text 
The words of the First Amendment clearly single out reli- 
gion for both a benefit and a burden. "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof. . . ."g On its face, the language grants a 
unique advantage to religious conduct, protecting it from gov- 
ernmental imposition; and imposes a unique disadvantage, 
preventing the government from supporting it. To understand 
this as a provision which puts religion on an  equal footing with 
other bases for action seems to be a curious reading. There are 
no "free exercise" or "establishment" provisions for science, 
sports, philosophy or family relations. The language itself thus 
seems to answer whether we have a paradigm of equality or of 
liberty; the language of the Free Exercise Clause is clearly in 
the form of a grant of liberty.'' 
It must also be noted that this grant of liberty is in lan- 
guage as absolute as that found anywhere in the Constitution. 
Other provisions in the Bill of Rights contain moderating quali- 
fiers: "unreasonable searches and seizures,"" c'excessiue 
bail,"12 "cruel and unusual p~nishments,"'~ "due process of 
law."'* The words of the Free Exercise Clause, by contrast, 
seem pure and inclusive: no law prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion.'' Only the protections of speech and press are as ab- 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
10. Laycock, supra note 5, at 13-14. 
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
12. Id. amend. VIII (emphasis added). 
13. Id. (emphasis added). 
14. Id. amends. V & XIV (emphasis added). 
15. One could, of course, focus on words other than those emphasized. See 
Pepper, AZtenatives, supra note 3, at 353 11.195. For example, "prohibit" is a differ- 
ent usage than "abridge," which is the usage applied to other First Amendment 
freedoms. Does this mean that government can impinge on religious conduct short 
of outright prohibition, while it cannot even abridge speech and press? Government 
could prohibit Jews or Catholics from voting or holding office, or tax them at a 
higher rate, under such a view. But those seem exactly the kind of abuses that 
the framers intended to prevent, and I know of no scholar or court which has 
seriously suggested such a wooden reading. Or one could focus on "Congress" as 
the only governmental entity limited by the Amendment, thus leaving all other 
governmental actors free to impbge on religious conduct as they see fit. But the 
federal government ads, for the most part, through delegation of congressional 
authority. (Thus, the IRS would clearly be covered.) And there has been no inclina- 
tion that I know of to interpret the First Amendment differentidy in its applica- 
tion to the judiciary and executive, as the "Congress" usage might suggest. More- 
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solute in terminology. 
Speech and press are inherently limited in their impact, 
however, because they are a particular, limited species of con- 
duct. They refer to communication only, and as such their con- 
sequences are inherently limited: they have an impact directly 
only on other human minds; they can cause no direct injuries 
because further consequences must be mediated through the 
recipient of the communication. "Exercise," to the contrary, 
denotes action in general, and "religion" is not limited in its 
ordinary understanding to communicative acts. "Exercise of 
religion" covers religiously mandated smuggling and shelter of 
aliens (the "sanctuary" movement), smuggling of slaves from 
slave states to free (the underground railroad), human sacri- 
fice, the sacramental drinking of wine, refusal to send one's 
children to public school, and so ,on. Neither "religion" nor "ex- 
ercise" provides the kind of inherent limits that come with 
"speech" and "press." This distinction is demonstrated within 
the First Amendment itself. Assembly . . . "to petition the Gov- 
ernment for a redress of grievances" is included in First 
Amendment protection,16 and it is communication. But unlike 
speech and press, "assembly" is not inherently limited, and 
thus the First Amendment protection is limited in its terms to 
"peaceabl[ey assembly only." No similar modifier appears in  
regard to exercise of religion, thus making this freedom the 
most absolute in its terminology of any in the Constitution. 
Perhaps the absence of a modifier is an accident and with- 
out meaning. But the framers had more limited models at 
hand, which they did not choose. An examination of language 
available to, but not chosen by, the framers crosses into an 
area of both history and text. During the same period when it 
was drafting the First Amendment, Congress adopted the 1787 
Ordinance for the Government of the Northwest Territory, 
providing that: "No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable 
over, the other nine amendments in the Bill of Rights do not share this usage, 
suggesting it had no limiting meaning. The religion clauses certainly were not 
intended to apply to the states, but the application of the Bill of Rights to the 
states is a large and complex issue. See, e.g., MARK D. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND 
THE WILDERNESS 19-23 (1965); WILBER G. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTI- 
TUTIONS 8-10 (1964). Suffice it to note that if the other provisions of the Bill of 
Rights are held applicable to the states, there is no reason not to also apply the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
17. Id. 
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and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his 
mode of worship, or religious sentiments, in the said territo- 
ry."18 Similarly, Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious 
Freedom, introduced in Virginia in 1779, passed in 1785, and 
well known by the framers of the First Amendment, provided: 
[Nlo man. . . shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or 
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on 
account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men 
shall be fiee to profess, and by argument to maintain their 
opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no 
wise diminish, enlarge, or effect their civil capacities.lg 
The absoluteness of the language of the Free Exercise Clause, 
so different from both of these then-available models concern- 
ing freedom of religion and from the phrasing of other civil 
liberties in the Constitution, is consistent with an earlier artic- 
ulation of James Madison in a seminal document of American 
religious freedom, his A Memorial and Remonstrance: 'We 
maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no mans [sic] 
right is abridged by the institution of .Civil Society, and that 
Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance."20 Significantly, 
Madison drafted the original version of the First Amendment 
and was the moving force in Congress behind its passage.21 
B. History 
The history surrounding the religion clauses is a large 
subject, and one much written about. Most of that writing has 
tended to focus upon the Establishment Clause," although it 
18. 1 ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE I N  THE UNITED STATES 480 (1950) 
(emphasis added). 
19. Id. (emphasis added). 
20. JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE (1785), reprinted in 
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 55, 56 (Robert S. AUey ed., 1985). 
21. W I ~  L. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY 120-21 (1986); STOKES, supra note 
18, at 339-50, 538-48. It is worth noting that Madison used the phrase "free exer- 
cise of Religion" as early as 1776 in his suggested language for the Virginia Decla- 
ration of Rights, Hunt, James Madison and Religious Liberty, Am. Hist. A. AM. 
Rep. for the Year 1901 at 166-67 (1902), and that he used the same language from 
the Declaration in his 1785 Remonstrance. 
22. A notable recent exception is Michael W. McCo~ell ,  The Origins and His- 
torical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990), 
which provides a thorough examination of the subject. What follows in this brief 
section addressing the history of the clauses is in accord with the evidence present- 
ed by Professor McCo~ell, and is consistent with his account, although it was 
first written prior to publication of his work. See supra note *. 
71 CONFLICTING PARADIGMS 15 
is the same history behind both clauses. Because it is a legal 
document we are attempting to interpret, history as it relates 
to  the intentions and meaning of those who framed and adopt- 
ed the First Amendment is surely relevant. Because it is a 
constitution we are interpreting, a document intended to  be 
lasting and therefore at least somewhat elastic and vague, that 
relevant history may well not be determinative. Here, &er a 
few preliminary observations, I will elaborate on three aspects 
of the historical background which are helpful in contemporary 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and point toward the 
conclusion that the relatively absolute language of the Free 
Exercise Clause may not have been an accident. 
As I have suggested elsewhere, the clearest, least contro- 
versial, narrow understanding of the original purpose of the 
religion clauses is to see them as aimed at two different aspects 
of the perceived evil of government affiliation with religion.23 
The Establishment Clause was aimed at prohibiting federal 
government support for one or several sects through affirmative 
provisions such as subsidies or declarations of dogma. The Free 
Exercise Clause was aimed at prohibiting support for one or 
several favored sects through negative provisions aimed at  
other disfavored sects such as limitation of the franchise, im- 
prisonment, or banishment. Certain provisions of religious 
"establishments" with which the colonists were familiar could 
be categorized under either heading; for example, legally man- 
dated church attendance. It is accurate to  characterize this 
intention as both "disestablishment" and as "separation of 
church and state."24 
Moving beyond this narrow understanding to resolve con- 
temporary issues on the basis of history is very diffcult be- 
cause those who supported this "disestablishment" and "separa- 
tion of church and state" did so for very different motives.25 
There were at least three significant streams of thought coming 
together to support adoption of the religion clauses, two of 
which will be discussed further below. The Enlightenment- 
deist-rationalist view perceived separation primarily as protect- 
23. See Pepper, Altenatives, supra note 3, at 313. 
24. 'Disestablishment" is somewhat inappropriate because there was no federal 
establishment to begin with. "Separation of church and state" is somewhat inappro- 
priate because it has a potential meaning far larger than the narrow meaning 
given above. 
25. Pepper, &ternatives, supra note 3, at 311-17. 
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ing the state-this new experimental federal governmenefrom 
the likely disruptive and possibly destructive influence of orga- 
nized religion. The radical protestant view, to  the contrary, saw 
separation as protection for the church from the profane and 
corrupt influence of the state. In number, these two streams 
were far from a majority of those supporting separation, but 
they had influence far beyond those numbers. The Enlighten- 
ment-deist-rationalist stream, exemplified by Jefferson and 
Madison, was prominently represented among the educated 
elite and was the preeminent influence in constructing the 
theory and drafting the text of the Constitution. It is thus no 
accident, although it is certainly surprising, that the Constitu- 
tion is a so thoroughly secular document, with but three pass- 
ing references to anythmg religious. The radical protestants, on 
the other hand, were the "outs," whose church was not estab- 
lished both because they were the minority and because they 
believed in separation as a religious principle. To a significant 
extent and particularly in Virginia, they provided the political 
steam t o  power the movement for disestablishment and separa- 
tioaZ6 
The third and probably largest stream of thought perceived 
the religion clauses of the First Amendment as a federalism 
provision. These were the "ins." Content with the religious 
establishments that were currently the status quo in their 
home states, disinclined to a contest with other religions over 
support from the new federal government, and somewhat .anx- 
ious about who might win if the federal government were al- 
lowed to support and inhibit religion in the way the colonial 
governments had in the recent past, this group supported the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses as limits on the fed- 
eral government only, leaving the states free in the realm of 
church and state." Given the vast growth in federal govern- 
ment, this view would leave substantial coverage for the k e e  
Exercise Clause: the Bob Jones casez8 involved federal law as 
did recent cases concerning social security numbers:' use of 
26. RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 4-26 (1972); 
HOWE, supra note 15, at 1-31; MILLER, supra note 21, at 120-21. 
27. See HOWE, supra note 15, at 19-23; KATZ, supra note 15, at 8-10. 
28. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); see i@a discussion 
accompanying notes 84-87. 
29. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
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national forest lands:' and yarmulkes in the military.31 But 
most cases concern state law, such as Nebraska's driver's li- 
cense rules and Oregon's criminal law concerning usage of 
peyote, and here the clauses would not apply. 
The federalism view has become an anachronism. Over the 
last hundred years the Supreme Court has incorporated most 
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights generally, and the First 
Amendment in particular, into the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and applied them to the states. Wheth- 
er or not this was justified in terms of the intentions and pur- 
poses of those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, a very 
large and controversial topic, it is now quite clearly the law of 
the Constitution-a de facto binding constitutional amendment. 
Thus the still relevant historical purposes and meanings are 
primarily those of the Enlightenment-deist-rationalist view and 
the radical protestant view. Before turning to these perspec- 
tives, however, some basic historical context is useful. 
I .  Simple history 
It is important to  remember that the notion of a secular 
government was a new and relatively untried idea at the time 
of the American revolution. The relation between church and 
state was not a marginal problem for the colonists as it is for 
us. Civil strife over issues of religion and state was a more o r  
less constant problem in the historical background of the colo- 
nists who were engaged in creating new independent states 
and a new federal government when the religion clauses were 
adopted. Not far in the past was a history of armed conflict and 
bloodshed over issues of religion and state. The long-term back- 
ground was the Reformation and the several hundred years of 
armed European conflict over state affiliation with one religion 
or another. The more recent history for most was the less 
bloody English background of constant strife and suspicion: 
first, the break from Roman Catholicism under Henry VIII; 
next, the attendant fear of both external and internal Catholi- 
cism; and finally, the Anglican-Puritan conflict. Many of the 
colonies had been created by groups seeking shelter from these 
conflicts and the burdens of practicing a religion disapproved 
by the state. And because the alliance of church and state was 
30. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
31. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
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the only available model, that alliance, and its attendant strife, 
was then replicated in  the colonies. These were not distant 
problems. In 1774 Madison wrote to a friend about "five or six 
well-meaning men in  close jail [in the adjacent county] for 
publishing their religious sentiments, which in the main are 
very or tho do^.'"^ 
Being put in jail for your relatively "orthodox" religious 
opinions can make you rather angry-probably fighting angry. 
That, and far worse, was the reality of the history of the alli- 
ances between church and state for those who were drafting 
and adopting the First Amendment; that was the patrimony 
and the dilemma facing those who were creating a new govern- 
ment. As a matter of historical fact the alliance of church and 
state meant trouble. I t  was that problem, well-known and gen- 
eral, that the framers of the First Amendment were trying to 
ameliorate with their experiment in the separation of church 
and state. Part I1.E. considers more directly what that suggests 
for contemporary interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. 
2. The Enlightenment-deist -rationalist view 
Consistent with the clearest narrow understanding of the 
historical intention of the religion clauses noted above, it is 
common now to assert that both clauses had a single primary 
purpose: freedom of religion.33 The free exercise provision di- 
rectly protected that freedom while the non-establishment 
provision was perceived as the primary necessary instrumental 
provision to assure it indirectly. While there is probably some 
truth to this assertion, it leaves out a major concern of those 
approaching the issue fiom the Enlightenment perspective. 
From that approach, the alliance of church and state threatens 
good government in general, not just in relation to freedom of 
religion." From this perspective, the lesson of history was 
that the alliance tends toward absolutism in government and 
toward political division and strife over religious issues. Free- 
dom in general (limited government) and freedom of inquiry in 
particular were crucial to progress and good government. A 
church formally c o ~ e c t e d  to the state was seen as likely to be 
hostile to such freedom. In this view, organized religion is per- 
32. LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 91 (rev. ed. 1967). 
33. See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1160-61, 
1201-04 (2d ed. 1988). 
34. MORGAN, supra note 26, at 16-18. 
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ceived as backward and threatening. I t  is impossible to read 
Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Re1 igious Freedom or Madison's 
A Memorial and Remonstrance, for example, without noticing 
this perspective. Madison, in one of many examples from the 
Remonstrance: 
What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had 
on Civil Society? In some instances they have been seen to 
erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of the Civil authority; 
in many instances they have been seen upholding the thrones 
of political tyranny: in no instance have they been seen the 
guardians of the liberties of the people.35 
This view is an inversion of the commonly stated one above 
that both clauses have freedom of religion as their primary 
purpose. Here, to the contrary, the Establishment Clause is 
seen as crucial to good government, its purpose is good govern- 
ment in general;36 and the Free Exercise Clause is a necessary 
instrument to support the primary Establishment Clause goal 
of separating the churches from the government. From this 
perspective freedom of religion also may have been seen as a 
significant good in itself, but that was of secondary impor- 
tance. 37 
35. MADISON, supra note 20, at 58. 
36. This understanding of the Clause continues to have substantial vitality. 
The mixing of government and religion can be a threat to free govern- 
ment, even if no one is forced to participate. When the government puts 
its imprimatur on a particular religion, it conveys a message of exclusion 
to all those who do not adhere to the favored beliefs. A government can- 
not be premised on the belief that all persons are created equal when it 
asserts that God prefers some. Only "[alnguish [sic], hardship and bitter 
strife" result "when zealous religious groups struggl[e] with one another to 
obtain the Government's stamp of approval." Such a struggle can "strain 
a political system to the breaking point." 
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2665-66 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quot- 
ing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962) and Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 
664, 694 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (citations & footnote omitted)). 
37. Steven Smith denominates this the "civil peace rationale" for religious free- 
dom and acknowledges that it "probably influenced the founding generation." Ste- 
ven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 163-66 (1991). He argues, however, that to consider it the 
"primary rationale" is probably "anachronistic," pointing out that even Jefferson 
and Madison relied substantially on other reasons. Both Smith and McComell have 
concluded that the radical protestant view, to be discussed infra, was more com- 
mon and influential. Id.; McCo~ell ,  supra note 22. This is probably true, but 
Smith probably deemphasizes the Enlightenment view too much. Particularly in 
light of the general prevalence of a religious point of view, documented by Smith 
and McConnell among many others, the Constitution's lack of reference to God and 
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There is a sub-element of this view which should be men- 
tioned briefly here, and will be returned to later. Enlighten- 
ment thought is rational, skeptical and scientific. It is both a 
symptom and a cause of secularization. The American Constitu- 
tion, a strikingly secular document, is clearly the product of 
this thought. The Establishment Clause makes sense in this 
scheme as a guarantor of secular government. But the Free 
Exercise Clause is harder to understand. I have suggested in 
previous writing that the Free Exercise Clause may well repre- 
sent the compromise that those supporting the relatively new 
secular world view were willing to make with the preexisting, 
and hitherto dominant, religious world view.38 The bounds of 
that compromise do not of themselves appear from the lan- 
guage of the clauses or this history. And had the issue been 
addressed directly, there would probably not have been agree- 
ment even among those working from the Enlightenment 
view,39 not to mention between those who shared this view 
and those who remained firmly attached to a religious view. 
This notion of a compromise between those of the Enlighten- 
ment-deist-rationalist view and those with a strong and widely 
held religious view makes more sensible the surprisingly abso- 
lute language of the Free Exercise Clause and may suggest 
that real power was contemplated for the Clause even by those 
primarily in the Enlightenment stream of thought. In this 
regard there is some striking social contract imagery used by 
Madison that will be quoted in the Structure and Theory sec- 
tion below. 
3. The radical protestant view 
The radical protestant view shared with the Enlighten- 
ment view a firm belief in separating church and state, but the 
religion, see infra note 42, is both surprising and significant. And Jefferson and 
Madison, who resonated with and articulated the Enlightenment view quite clearly, 
were pivotal and influential adors in the history of religious liberty and the con- 
struction of the First Amendment. Each will be discussed briefly as the discussion 
proceeds below. As to Madison, see supra note 21; MADISON, supm note 20; and 
Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
299, 301-03 [hereinafter Pepper, Taking]; see also supra part 1I.C. As to Jefferson, 
see Pepper, Alternatiues, supra note 3, at 319-20, and sources cited therein. 
38. See Pepper, ALternatiues, supra note 3, at 378; Pepper, Taking, supm note 
37, at 304-06. 
39. A clear difference between Jefferson and Madison will be mentioned at the 
beginning of the Doctrine and Precedent discussion, infra part 1I.D. 
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motive was quite different: it was the church which was threat- 
ened by and needed to be removed from the state, not the state 
which needed protection. And religion needed protection from 
the state's support as well as its potential hostility; official 
governmental support was a corruption to the purity of the 
church. Thus from the believer's side it is the Free Exercise 
Clause which is of most importance-a guaranty that the 
church will not be interfered with by government-and the 
Establishment Clause takes on the more instrumental role. 
Roger Williams was the initial and eloquent proponent of sepa- 
ration as a necessity for religion, and his image of the "garden" 
of religion needing protection from the "wilderness" of the secu- 
lar world, including the state, is e~emplary.~' The community 
apart, the chosen, the need for separation from the errant 
world, is a recurrent and strong theme in protestantism. Cre- 
ation of a community of truth requires shelter from the larger 
community, including its perhaps well-intentioned laws. A 
direct line runs from this understanding to the situation of the 
Amish, who refuse to send their children to public school or to 
participate in the social security system, and to Mrs. Quaring. 
The intervening centuries change the perspective of the insular 
religious community little, but they add a pervasiveness of law 
(public schools, driver's licenses, a voluminous ubiquitous tax 
code) that makes separation of garden from wilderness a far 
more daunting task. 
In his foreword on the Bob Jones case, Robert Cover made 
an observation which exemplifies this view and which reso- 
nates with the compromise that the Enlightenment under- 
standing may have been making with the adoption of the Free 
Exercise Clause: 
There is a powerful, almost physical image a t  work in the 
conception to which the Amish and Mennonites implicitly 
appeal in their constitutional confession. The image is one of 
a dedicated, sacred space, a refuge carved out from the gener- 
al secular, legal space of the state. Within the dedicated nom- 
ic refuge, there is an accommodation to a religious rule of 
recognition expressed in Acts 529-"We ought to obey God 
rather than men"-instead of submission to the principle, 
embodied in article VI, section 2 of the Constitution, that 
"[tlhis Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme 
40. See generally HOWE, supra note 15, at 1-31. 
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Law of the land 
C. Structure and Theory 
As noted above, the Constitution is a remarkably secular 
document creating a secular government." The Establishment 
Clause appears thoroughly consistent with that document in 
that it attempts to assure that the secular government remains 
secular. The Free Exercise Clause, to the contrary, contains a 
remarkably absolute protection for religious conduct dacult to 
square, on its face, with the rest of the Constitution. From the 
radical protestant perspective, of course, this absolute protec- 
tion is perfectly sensible: the government is left free to be what 
the government wants to be, but space must be left for the 
church to be what it must be. The Free Exercise Clause creates 
that  space. From the Enlightenment side the apparent capa- 
ciousness of that space is more difficult to explain. James Mad- 
ison, using the imagery of the social contract, may supply the 
answer. He defines religion as "the duty which we owe to our 
Creator and the manner of discharging it,"'3 and then asserts: 
This duty is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of 
obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can 
be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be con- 
sidered as  a subject of the Governour of the Universe: And if 
a member of Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate 
Association, must always do it with a reservation of his duty 
to the General Authority; much more must every man who 
becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a 
saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign .44 
41. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term--Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 30 (1983). 
42. The text of the Constitution has only three references to religion; two are 
oblique and the third excludes religion from political relevance: 
(1) the clause exempting Sundays as days to be counted in determining 
the period of time within which the President must exercise his veto; (2) 
the dating of the document as "in the year of our Lord one thousand 
seven hundred and eighty seven," and (3) the crucial clause of Article VI 
[proscribing] religious tests for office. 
MORGAN, supra note 26, at 20. 
43. MADISON, supra note 20, at 56 (quoting VA. DECLARATION F RIGHTS art. 
XVI (1776)). 
44. Id. 
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This passage proceeds to the conclusion quoted above45 that 
religion is "wholly exempt" from the rule of government, a 
conclusion consistent with the absolute language of the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
The procedural nature of the Constitution as a whole is 
congruent with this view of religion as a subject set aside from 
the general jurisdiction of government. The Constitution cre- 
ates structures and processes for making binding communal 
decisions; that is, it creates governmental mechanisms for mak- 
ing and implementing law.46 The Constitution does not an- 
nounce ultimate truths and it does not create mechanisms for 
discovering or announcing ultimate truths. (Note that it is the 
Declaration of Independence that announces 'We hold these 
truths t o  be self-evident . . . The Constitution has other 
business at hand.) Ultimate truths or reality are left in the 
non-governmental sphere; they are for individuals or groups to  
discover. Truth as seen by the individual or group may form 
the basis for their actions within the processes of govern- 
ment? it may provide the motive for law making and applica- 
tion; but truth is neither the object nor the result of govern- 
mental processes. 
This view of the Constitution provides an integral under- 
standing of the First Amendment under which at least one of 
its purposes is to keep ultimate truth, and the mechanisms for 
finding it, outside of the sphere of government control. The 
connection between the freedoms of speech and press and the 
truth are well articulated in constitutional law. The place of 
religion beside them in the First Amendment is understand- 
able: in the view of the believer it represents ultimate truth, 
the ground from which all else proceeds. The Establishment 
Clause prevents ultimate truth (or those who believe they know 
it) from impinging too directly upon both government and those 
who may not share that understanding of the truth. The Free 
45. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
46. The almost exclusively process oriented nature of the Constitution is one of 
the primary points of John H. Ely's DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). The choice 
among processes of course involves substance. See Paul Brest, The Substance of 
Process, 42 OHIO STATE L.J. 131 (1981). 
47. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (US. 1776). 
48. See generally Frederick M .  Gedicks, Some Political Implications of Religious 
Belief, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL? 419 (1990); Frederick M. Gedicks 
& Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy and Values: Some Thoughts on Religion 
and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAI,. L. REV. 1579 (1987). 
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Exercise Clause prevents the government from impinging upon 
the ultimate truth of the belie~er.~' 
From a different structural perspective, the religion clauses 
are prominent as one of very few provisions in the Constitution 
which clearly support mediating institutions. Religion, as un- 
derstood both by the framers and contemporary observers, is 
primarily a group phenomenon; it is very diEcult to read the 
clauses without perceiving an intention to create a space apart 
for religion, and therefore for religious  institution^.^' The 
clauses are "liberal" in the sense of focusing upon liberty and 
restraining government, but they are more "civic republican" 
and communitarian in  their support for one of the primary 
intermediate  institution^.^^ The Free Exercise Clause may 
well be the only explicit support for non-governmental commu- 
nity in the Con~t i tu t ion ,~~ and this is of major significance. 
We have here no image of the "self-constituted" individual, no 
"liberalism" of lonely, isolated individualism." Rather we 
have a space, a liberty, for groups and for individuals. And 
given the prominence of the radical protestant vision, there is 
reason to think of the group as constituting the individuals to 
as significant an extent as the individuals constituting the 
group* 
Thus we have three different but complementary theoreti- 
cal perspectives on the Free Exercise Clause. It can be seen as 
a Lockean social contract provision protecting liberty and re- 
49. See generally Nomi M. Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out": 
Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 581 (1993). The right to assemble to petition for redress of grievances is the 
.one First Amendment right that does not f i t  easily into this understanding. 
50. "The religion clauses of the Constitution seem to me unique in the clarity 
with which they presuppose a collective, norm-generating community whose status 
as a community and whose relationship with the individuals subject to its norms 
are entitled to constitutional recognition and protection." Cover, supra note 41, at  
32 n.94. See Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Reli- 
gious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99; Michael W. Mcconnell, Accommodation 
of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 17-19. 
51. See Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 729- 
38 (1986), reprinted in MARK TUSHNET, RED, W ~ E ,  AND BLUE (1988); McConnell, 
supm note 50, at 19-21. 
52. Freedom of association must be implied from other explicit constitutional 
provisions. See infm note 54 and accompanying text. Federalism may be the other 
explicit support for community, but that is governmental community. 
53. For a critique of modern liberalism, a id  by implication much modern con- 
stitutional law and interpretation, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE 
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). For a critique of the critique, see C. Edwin Baker, 
Sandel on Rawls, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 895 (1985). 
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straining government by carving out an area free from govern- 
mental impingement. This demarcated area of freedom of reli- 
gion can also be seen as part of a more general exclusion of 
ultimate truth from the control of the government based upon 
the larger structure of the Constitution as an almost exclusive- 
ly procedural document and upon the First Amendment as a 
whole. And, finally, the restraint upon government articulated 
by the Free Exercise Clause supports the mediating structure 
of the church (or other religious groups) as a locus for activity 
and meaning beyond governmental interference. 
The second and third theoretical views are more comple- 
mentary than may first appear. To the extent one sees the 
Constitution as a procedural document which fences govern- 
ment out of decisions about ultimate truth through its struc- 
ture, purpose, and through the First Amendment as a whole, 
space for intermediate institutions is created; and, given the 
social nature of persons and of their intellectual and spiritual 
endeavors, this is a necessary space if the limit on government 
is to  have any significant effect. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the Supreme Court has implied from the First Amend- 
ment as a whole a right of "freedom of association" not found in 
the text.54 The structure and theoretical values drive toward 
such a conclusion. And it is significant that with the Free Exer- 
cise Clause there is no need for such implication; the "right of 
association" is there quite explicit. 
Before moving on, it should be noted that there is a struc- 
tural view of the First Amendment and the role of the religion 
clauses within it that is quite different from the one sketched 
above. This view focuses on the content of the entire Amend- 
ment. Speech, press and assembly to petition for redress of 
grievances all involve communication, including in the latter 
case a gathering together for communication. Much religious 
activity is communicative in nature. As noted above, one key 
function of religion may be the determination and affirmation 
of ultimate truth. And prototypical religious conduct is proba- 
bly worship: a gathering together for conduct which is primari- 
ly communicative. Noscitur a sociisf a maxim of statutory 
54. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); 
JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL L W $ 16.41 (3d ed. 1986); NAACP v. 
Alabama a rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609 (1984); TRIBE, supm note 33, at $$ 12-26 & 14-16. 
55. "It is known from its associates. The meaning of a word is or may be 
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construction, suggests determining the meaning of a word from 
accompanying words. Religion thus interpreted with the accom- 
panying language of the First Amendment could be read to be 
limited to the kinds of conduct otherwise covered by the 
Amendment: communication and association for the purpose of 
communication, with the symbolic speech conduct typical of 
worship being the only conduct explicitly added by reference to 
religion.56 Leaving the Establishment Clause aside, the First 
Amendment becomes a functional whole under this interpreta- 
tion. In  the process, however, the protection for religious con- 
duct aside from worship disappears, and the Free Exercise 
Clause becomes nothing more than an explicitly mentioned 
instance of freedom of speech and press. 
Such a view is consistent with the Enlightenment-deist- 
rationalist perspective described above, and from this direction, 
a paradigm of equality for religious bases of belief with others 
makes some sense. As Justice Jackson articulated the position: 
"It was to assure religious teaching as much freedom as secular 
discussion, rather than to assure it greater license, that led to 
its separate ~tatement."~' But this perspective leaves out the 
radical protestant view, which may well have been domi- 
nantf and is difficult to reconcile with a text which is 
phrased as an absolute grant of freedom of religion. 
D. Doctrine and Precedent 
Thomas Jefferson appears to have preferred a view of reli- 
gious freedom congruent with this last understanding of the 
First Amendment, a view which protects religious opinion and 
expression but nothing more." The operative language of his 
Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom was restricted to "opinion, 
belief, profession and argument."60 Beyond this, the govern- 
ment could act: "[Ilt is time enough for the rightful purposes of 
known from the accompanying words." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (6th .ed. 
1990). 
56. Marshall, Free Exercise as Free Expression, supra note 6, at 545; Pepper, 
Alternatives, supra note 3, at 367-68. 
57. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., concur- 
ring in the result). 
58. McConnell, supra note 22; Smith, supra note 37. 
59. David Little, Thomas Jefferson's Rdtgious Views and Their Inf2uence on the 
Supreme Court's Interpretation of the First Amendment, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 57, 
58-64 (1976). 
60. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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civil government for its offieers to interfere when principles 
break out into overt acts against peace and good order."' The 
operative language of the Free Exercise Clause is not limited to 
speech and opinion, however, and Madison, who was intimately 
involved in the drafting, as Jefferson was not, had a rather 
different view of when government could act to restrict reli- 
gious conduct. His suggested language for the 1776 Virginia 
Declaration of Rights not only used "free exercise" as the opera- 
tive language, but further stated that "no man or class of men 
ought on account of religion be subject to any penalties or dis- 
abilities, unless under color of religion the preservation of 
equal liberty, and the existence of the State be manifestly en- 
dangered."62 Jefferson's view is where the Supreme Court 
started with its first interpretation of the clause. One hundred 
years later the announced doctrine of the Court was more con- 
gruent with Madison. Then, in an abrupt turnaround in 1990, 
the Court returned to  the Jeffersonian understanding. 
Reynolds v. United States" is that first Jefferson-based 
interpretation, and it is worth a brief detour as an example of 
the historical, textual, and structural concerns we have consid- 
ered. The persecution of and violence aimed at the Mormons is 
a useful reminder of the "simple history" mentioned above and 
of the concern that history generated for the framers: religious 
dserences tend to  beget violence and bloodshed. Quite literally 
in search of space in which to live out their religious convic- 
tions, the Mormons vacated civilization and moved to the great 
western desert to create their Zion in the wilderness. George 
Reynolds, following his religious duty as a Mormon, was mar- 
ried to more than one woman. Under federal law, this bigamy 
was a crime, but the First Amendment protected the "free exer- 
cise" of religion. From the radical protestant perspective, the 
polygamy of the Mormons is the garden, and the state's crimi- 
nal law is an intrusion from the wilderness. If the religion 
clauses protect the church, the criminal law must not intrude. 
But from the Enlightenment perspective of protecting the state 
from the incursion of religion, the criminal law is a primary 
mechanism of government that ought to be protected from 
intrusive religious claims. If the Free Exercise Clause is the 
Enlightenment's compromise, George Reynolds presents the 
61. STOKES, supm note 18. 
62. Hunt, supra note 21, at 166-67. 
63. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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question of the bounds of that compromise: How extensive is 
the sheltering space? 
We know that Jefferson's view confines freedom of religion 
to opinion and belief, but George Reynolds actually married a 
second wife; he did not just believe in polygamy. This is con- 
duct clearly beyond worship, or any cluster of communicative 
activities otherwise protected under the First Amendment. On 
its face, polygamy does not appear to be conduct which threat- 
ens "equal liberty" or the "existence of the State," but that may 
well have been arguable.64 The Court had no need to struggle 
with the absolute language of the clause, or with Madison's 
relatively absolute notions ("wholly exempt"), however, because 
the Justices simply relied on Jefferson for the proposition that 
freedom of religion protected belief only and not action. 
From this rather constricted initial interpretation, the 
Court retreated, but very slowly. In the 1940 opinion deciding 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court announced that the Free 
Exercise Clause was not limited to  protection of belief, it also 
protected "freedom to act," although to a significantly lesser 
degree. Freedom to believe was "absolute," but action could be 
regulated "for the protection of society" as long as government 
did not "unduly infringe the protected freedom.'s5 Cantwell 
was one of a long series of Jehovah's Witnesses cases in which 
the Supreme Court announced a great deal of First Amend- 
ment law, but did not clearly distinguish the parameters of free 
speech from freedom of religiod6 For the most part, there 
was little need to do so because the conduct of the Witnesses 
was almost exclusively communicative-classic speech, press 
and assembly activity such as street corner proselytization 
through direct conversation, the playing of records, and the 
64. The opinion does rely in part on the assertion that polygamy leads to "sta- 
tionary despotism." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. Justice Souter's concurring opinion 
in the Hialeah case asserts that Reynolds remains valid on this basis, meeting the 
Sherbert-Yoder test described below. 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2245-47 (1993). The Reynolds 
opinion is complex and interesting and I have analyzed it elsewhere at  some 
length. See Pepper, Altemtives, supra note 3, at 317-26. 
65. 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). Cantwell is also significant as the opinion in 
which the Court clarifies that the Free Exercise Clause is applicable as a limit on 
governmental action by the states through the Due Process Clause of the Four- 
teenth Amendment. The Clause has been "incorporated" into the Fourteenth 
Amendment so as to apply against the states. 
66. See, e.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Martin v. City 
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 
U.S. 444 (1938). See also Pepper, Altemtives, supra note 3, at 326-30. 
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distribution of handbills. Free speech and press doctrine was 
sufficient to reach decisions concerning this kind of conduct. 
For this reason, and probably others as well, throughout this 
extensive span of precedent it was never clear that the Free 
Exercise Clause protected anything beyond the kinds of non- 
religious conduct protected by the speech, press and assembly 
clauses. It was thus unclear whether the Free Exercise Clause 
had any contemporary effect o r  had, instead, become only a 
vestigial anachroni~m.~' 
With Sherbert v. Vernerss in 1963 and Wisconsin v. 
Yoders9 in 1972 the Supreme Court clarified that the Free Ex- 
ercise Clause did have an ambit of its own well beyond that of 
other First Amendment freedoms. In doing so it articulated a 
doctrine and a test which seems much closer to  the Madisonian 
vision of free exercise quoted above than to the Jeffersonian 
understanding relied on by the Reynolds court. In Sherbert, 
Adell Sherbert lost her job, and was unable to find another, 
because of her refusal to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. She 
was denied unemployment compensation benefits on the basis 
of having refused to accept "suitable work." In Yoder, Amish 
parents refused on the basis of religious belief to send their 
children to school for the final two years of compulsory educa- 
tion (ninth and tenth grades). The parents were convicted of a 
crime for violating the mandatory school-attendance law. In 
both cases the Supreme Court held that application of the law 
at issue to the religious conduct at issue was an impingement 
on freedom of religion prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause. 
The test announced and the language used suggested 
sweeping protection for religious conduct. In Sherbert the Court 
said that even an "incidental burden on the free exercise of 
appellant's religion may be justified [only] by a 'compelling 
state interest.' "'O Later in the opinion the Court put the mat- 
ter more emphatically: "[Iln this highly sensitive constitutional 
67. Under modern doctrine, governmental action intentionally or explicitly dis- 
criminating against religion is prohibited by the Establishment Clause, as is such 
conduct discriminating among religions. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15- 
16 (1947); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636-42 (1978) ( B r e ~ a n ,  J., concurring); 
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). Including religion with race as a suspect 
classification under the Equal Protection Clause also has the effect of rendering 
most such governmental conduct unconstitutional. See supra note 1. 
68. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
69. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
70. 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). 
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area, '[olnly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount inter- 
ests, give occasion for permissible limitation.' "?' Similarly, 
the Yoder court stated the test as follows: "The essence of all 
that has been said and written on the subject is that only those 
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served 
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of reli- 
gi~n."?~ 
Much has been written about the Court's free exercise 
opinions in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases and during the era 
when Sherbert and Yoder were the rule. This article will not 
attempt to cover that ground again, although it is interesting 
and w~rthwhile.'~ Rather, the following paragraphs briefly 
summarize the doctrine created in the Sherbert and Yoder 
opinions and the remarkable inconsistency with which that 
doctrine was applied by the Court. 
The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine had five main  component^.'^ 
First, action was protected-conduct beyond speech, press, or 
worship was included in the shelter of freedom of religion. 
Neither Sherbert's refusal to  work on the Sabbath nor the 
Amish parents' refusal to let their children attend ninth and 
tenth grades can be classified as conduct protected by the other 
clauses of the First Amendment. Second, indirect impositions 
on religious conduct, such as the denial of twenty-six weeks of 
unemployment insurance benefits t o  Adell Sherbert, as well as 
direct restraints, such as the criminal prohibition at issue in 
Yoder, were pr~hibited.'~ Third, as the language quoted above 
71. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
72. 406 US. at 215. 
73. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 33, a t  1154-301; Jesse H. Choper, The Free 
Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments, 
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943 (1986); George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secu- 
lar Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 863 (1988); Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The 
Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989) 
[hereinafter Lupu, Where Rights Begin]; Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and 
Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391 
(1987); Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6; Mar- 
shall, Free Exercise as Free Expression, supra note 6; Pepper, Taking, supra note 
37; Pepper, Alternutives, supm note 3. The multitude of sources cited in this mate- 
rial will lead the reader into the literature on the subject. 
74. See Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at  308-12. 
75. This is frequently called the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and stands 
for the proposition that a government cannot accomplish indirectly, through denial 
or conditioning of benefits, that which it is constitutionally prohibited from doing 
directly. Sherbert is a primary precedent in this line of cases which recently has 
become rather complex. I t  is a crucial doctrine for cases like Bob Jones Univ. v. 
United States, 461 US. 574 (1983) (non-profit status) and Quaring v. Peterson, 728 
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indicates, the protection granted was extensive. Only extremely 
strong governmental interests justified impingement on reli- 
gious conduct, as the absolute language of the text of the Free 
Exercise Clause suggests. 
Fourth, the strong language was backed by a requirement 
that the government provide proof of the important interest at  
stake and of the danger to that interest presented by the reli- 
gious conduct at issue. Fifth, in determining the injury to  the 
government's interest, a court was required t o  focus on the 
effect that exempting religious claimants fkom the regulation 
would have, rather than on the value of the regulation in gen- 
eral. Thus, injury to governmental interest had to be measured 
at the margin: assuming the law still applied to all others, 
what would be the effect of exempting the religious claimant in 
this case and other similarly situated religious claimants in the 
future?76 Together, the fourth and fifth elements required that 
facts, rather than speculation, had to be presented concerning 
how the government's interests would be harmed by excepting 
religious conduct from the law being challenged. 
Sherbert and Yoder adopted a balancing test for free exer- 
cise jurisprudence, and balancing tests are notoriously manipu- 
lable.77 Exaggeration of the weight on the governmental inter- 
est side of the balance is particularly likely through speculation 
about the effects of decisions adverse to  those interests and 
through defining those interests at a higher level of generality 
than the constitutional interests on the other side of the bal- 
ance. For example, in Prince v. Massachu~etts~~ an aunt took 
her niece proselytizing on the peaceful evening streets of 
Brockton. Sarah Prince, the aunt, was convicted of violating 
child labor laws. Despite the fad that none of the evils ordi- 
F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), afd by equally divided Court sub nom. Jensen v. 
Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (per curium, Powell, J., did not participate) (driver's 
license), where what is at issue is in the form of a government "benefit." In 
Sherbert the Court stated: "[Tlo condition the availability of benefits upon this 
appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effedive- 
ly penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties." 374 U.S. at 406. 
76. This fifth element is simply an application of the more general principle 
frequently referred to as the Yeast drastic means" analysis. This is usually pre- 
sented as an inquiry into whether the government can reach its goal or serve its 
interest through means which do not impinge-or which impinge significantly 
less--on the constitutional right at  issue. In this f&h element of the Sherbert- 
Yoder doctrine, the "less drastic means" is exempting religious claimants from an 
otherwise valid legal regulation. 
77. See Pepper, Alternutives, supra note 3, at 341-44, and sources cited there. 
78. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). . 
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narily associated with child labor were present in the case, the 
Supreme Court placed on the state interest side of the balance 
"the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that 
children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportuni- 
ties for growth" and the "crippling effects of child employment, 
more especially in public  place^."'^ The Court did not similar- 
ly inflate the other side of the balance. 
The effect of the fourth and fifth elements of the Sherbert- 
Yoder doctrine was to impose a discipline which helps prevent 
this kind of manipulation. In Sherbert the Court would not 
accept, without proof, speculation about the effect of possible 
future fraudulent religious claims on the compensation fund.80 
The government's interest in compulsory education is clearly 
"compelling," and ranks "at the very apex" of state f~nctions.~' 
But in  Yoder the Court refused to put this general interest on 
the balance, and instead focused upon the state's marginal 
interest in compulsory education of Amish children after the 
eighth grade, a matter of quite different weight. Exempting 
Amish children from required attendance for the ninth and 
tenth grades has relatively little effect on the state's generally 
compelling interest in public education." 
The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine was not applied consistently 
by the Supreme Court. Mrs. Quaring's case appeared to be an  
easy one under the doctrine because exempting the very few 
persons who would object to having photos on their driver's 
licenses would seem likely to have very little, if any, deleteri- 
ous effects on the interests of the state. (New York did not 
require photos on licenses until just a few years before the 
Quaring case, and Nebraska itself had several exceptions such 
as learner's permits.) Nonetheless, the United States Supreme 
Court split four to four, and because opinions are not issued in 
cases of tie votes, no explanation was given.83 
The situation presented in Bob Jones University was far 
more d i f f i ~ u l t . ~ ~  The university engaged in race discrimination 
mandated by religious belief. Because of this conduct, the Inter- 
79. Id. at 168 (citations omitted). 
80. 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963). 
81. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213. 
82. Id. at 221-29. 
83. See Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), afd by equally 
diviokd Court sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (per curiam, 
Powell, J., did not participate). 
84. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 US. 574 (1983). 
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nal Revenue Service revoked its tax exempt status, a major 
blow to a contemporary non-profit educational institution. The 
case was problematic because the effect of an exemption from 
race discrimination prohibitions in education based upon reli- 
gious convictions is hard to gauge. There is some evidence that 
fraudulent claims to such beliefs might be the result in some 
areas given the resistance to integrated education. But unlike 
the Yoder opinion where the Court carefully analyzed and 
weighed the interests on both sides, in Bob Jones it dealt with 
the constitutional question in three brief paragraphs. The 
Court cited both Sherbert and Yoder as the appropriate prece- 
dents (among others), and repeated the kind of sweeping pro- 
tection enunciated in those cases: in order to  "justify a limita- 
tion on religious liberty," the state must show "that it is essen- 
tial to accomplish an overriding governmental intere~t."'~ It 
proceeded to recognize the "compelling" nature of the 
government's general interest "in eradicating racial discrimina- 
tion in education."86 The fourth and fifth elements of the 
Sherbert-Yoder doctrine then disappeared, however, as the 
Court simply asserted that there were "no less restrictive 
means . . . available to achieve the governmental interest," but 
did not discuss why exemption was not an acceptable less dras- 
tic means in Bob Jones when it was in Yoder, or what effect 
such an exemption would have on the governmental intere~t.'~ 
In Unites States v. Lee,s8 a case dealing with the Amish 
mandate to live "separate and apart" in regard to  social securi- 
ty taxes rather than education, the Court recited the tests from 
Sherbert and Yoder, and then seemed not to  apply them in 
reaching the conclusion that the religious conduct was not 
protected. Instead of narrowing the government interest, the 
Court inflated it in a way reminiscent of the Prince de~ision.~' 
In the case of Bowen v. Roy," however, sincere religious objec- 
tion to obtaining a social security number was held protected. 
Even though a social security number was a statutory require- 
ment for receiving federal welfare benefits, exemption from 
85. Id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982)). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 604 (citations omitted). See Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for 
Racially Discriminatory Schools, 60 Tnr. L. REV. 259 (1982). 
88. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
89. Id. at 259-62. For a brief discussion of Lee, see Pepper, Conundrum, supra 
note 3, at 299-302. 
90. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
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that requirement was mandated by the C~urt .~ '  Justice 
O'Connor wrote a ringing endorsement of the Sherbert-Yoder 
doctrine in a separate opinion in Roy in 1986," but in 1988 
she wrote an opinion for the Court finding the doctrine entirely 
inapplicable to sincere religious objections by American Indians 
to planned construction of an access road through national 
forest land which included their most sacred sites.93 
In sum, the Court articulated the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine 
with some consistency, but only rarely applied it. Then, in a 
case in which the validity of the doctrine was neither ques- 
tioned nor argued, the Court abruptly and surprisingly denied 
that it had ever existed, and appears to have returned to a 
reading of the clause similar to that used in Reynolds. Justice 
Scalia authored the opinion for a five member majority. Assert- 
ing that the Court had "never held that an individual's reli- 
gious beliefs excused him from compliance with an otherwise 
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate," 
the opinion held that usage of peyote as a genuine, central reli- 
gious practice of the Native American Church was not shel- 
tered from criminal prosecution by the Free Exercise Cla~se. '~ 
91. There is some disagreement as to the holding in Bowen resulting from five 
opinions. A close reading of the opinions reveals that five justices followed the 
Sherbert-Yoder doctrine finding it unconstitutional to require the father to provide 
a social security number for his daughter as a condition for his receiving welfare 
benefits. See Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at 319-22. This understanding of the 
opinions in the case appears to be c o n h e d  in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals 
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140-42 (1987); but see the concurring opinions of Justices 
Powell and Stevens, id. at 146-48. 
92. 476 U.S. at 724 (O'Co~or,  J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
93. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 
(1988), discussed in Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 73. See also Pepper, 
Conundrum, supm note 3, at 281, for a brief discussion of the determinative issue 
in Lyng. Justice O'Connor also wrote an elaborate dissent in Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 528 (1986), a case dealing with the uniform require- 
ments of the military conflicting with the wearing of a yarmulke by an orthodox 
Jew. The Court held against the religious claimant in that case and in O'Lone v. 
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), a case dealing with a free exercise claim 
by a prison inmate. In both cases, I would suggest that the holdings result more 
directly from a wariness of the Court concerning the relation between the Bill of 
Rights and total institutions in general, than from a rejection of the Sherbert-Yoder 
doctrine. See Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at 322-23, and cases cited supra note 
109. 
94. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990). Justice O 'Co~or  
authored a concurrence arguing that the compelling interest test (what I have 
called the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine) was clearly the ruling and accepted interpreta- 
tion of the Free Exercise Clause, but concluding that the government had met its 
burden of showing a compelling interest. Id. at 891. Justice Blackmun, with whom 
Justices B r e ~ a n  and Marshall joined, dissented, agreeing with Justice O'Comor 
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In so ruling, the Court reached out to  decide an issue not pre- 
sented. The facts dealt with unemployment compensation, not 
criminal prosecution. And the Oregon Supreme Court had ruled 
that the criminality of the conduct was (1) irrelevant t o  the 
award or denial of unemployment compensation in Oregon and 
(2) hypothetical and hence irrelevant in the absence of a crimi- 
nal pr~ceeding.'~ Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court was 
remarkable for several reasons: (1) its lack of candor regarding 
the prior twenty-five years of precedent under the Sherbert- 
Yoder doctrine, (2) its refusal to honor the Oregon Supreme 
Court's interpretation of its own law concerning the irrelevance 
of uncharged criminal conduct to the award of unemployment 
compensation, and (3) its reaching out to undo a doctrine not 
put at issue in the briefs or oral argument and to decide an 
issue not genuinely before it. The opinion has been subject to 
well-deserved, sharp and extensive criticism, and efforts have 
been made to  map out what content the opinion may have left 
for the Free Exercise Clause.96 I shall not attempt to tread 
through that thicket here. 
It should be noted, however, that there are several factors 
which suggest that the doctrine announced in Smith might be 
short-lived. First, Justice O'Connor, who agreed with the result 
in Smith but authored a sharp and powerful concurrence as- 
serting the continued vitality and justice of the Sherbert-Yoder 
doctrine, has emerged over the last two terms as one of the 
leaders of the new, independent minded, centrist block on the 
Court, including herself and Justices Kennedy and Souter. 
Second, Justice Souter, who was appointed to the Court after 
the Smith decision to replace Justice Brennan, wrote a sepa- 
rate concurrence in the recent Hialeah decision expressing his 
disagreement with and criticizing the Smith ruling, indicating 
his understanding that the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine remains 
good law in conflict with Smith, and suggesting reasons why 
the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude reconsideration 
of the Smith rule." This was particularly significant because 
that the compelling interest test was the correct doctrine, but finding that, under 
the fads, the government had not shown such an interest. Id. at 907. 
95. See Smith v. Employment Div. 11, 763 P.2d 146, 147 & n.3, 148 (Or. 1988); 
Smith v. Employment Div. I, 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986). 
96. Excellent analysis of the case and what may be left of free exercise doc- 
trine can be found in Laycock, supra note 5, and McCo~ell, supra note 5. 
97. Church of the Lukurni Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 
2241-50 (1993). 
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Justice Souter agreed with the unanimous result in Hialeah 
and was not on the Court which considered Smith: the only 
purpose of the concurrence was to  put on the record his dis- 
agreement with a recent prior ruling, a rather unusual act for 
a relatively new Justice, and one clearly intended to signal 
lawyers and lower court judges that Smith might not be reli- 
able precedent. Third, Justice White, one of the five votes sup- 
porting Justice Scalia's revision of the meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause, has resigned from the Court. Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, nominated to  succeed him, is likely to  be more in- 
clined toward a liberty-oriented understanding of religious 
freedom, although there appears to be little indication on the 
record of her inclinations in this regard.g8 (On the other hand, 
Justice Kennedy, the third member of the influential central 
group, joined the Smith decision and authored the Hialeah 
majority decision which relied explicitly upon Smith. This 
would make it more dacult for him to change his position and 
join Justices O'Connor and Souter in a return to something like 
the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine. And Justice Thomas, who replaced 
Justice Marshall, joined in all but one portion of Justice 
Ke~edy ' s  Hialeah decision.gg Thus, the Court appears to  re- 
98. Judge Ginsburg dissented from the denial of a rehearing en banc in the 
free exercise case of Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 739 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), writing a brief opinion supportive of freedom of religion where the issue was 
the wearing of a yarmulke contrary to military regulations concerning the uniform. 
(Interestingly, then Judge Scalia, the author of Smith, joined her opinion.) The 
case was later decided by the Supreme Court against Doctor Goldman, the free 
exercise claimant. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). The Supreme 
Court's determination is best understood as part of a long line of decisions limiting 
first amendment freedoms in the special, limited rights contexts of the military 
and prisons. See Pepper, Taking, supra note 37 at 322-23. 
Judge Ginsburg has also authored two opinions applying the Sherbert-Yoder 
doctrine; one ruling in favor of a free exercise claimant; the other ruling against 
the claimant, finding a compelling governmental interest to support application of 
the law at issue. Leahy v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(overturning a summary judgment for the District, returning the case to the trial 
court, noting that "the District has not demonstrated that requiring a religious 
objector to provide his social security number in order to obtain a driver's license 
is the least restrictive means of achieving the concededly vital public safety objec- 
tive at  stake," id. at 1049, see notes 2, 83, 144, and accompanying text); Olsen v. 
Drug Enforcement Administration, 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding denial 
of free exercise protection for the use of marijuana; the fads of the case provide 
an interesting comparison with Smith, supra note 94). Judge Ginsburg also joined 
in the opinion in Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 0.C. Cir. 1983), a controversy 
concerning Native American objection to development of federal land, analogous to 
the Lyng case, supra note 93. 
99. 113 S. Ct. at 2221. 
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main in ap uneasy five to  four division on whether Smith or 
Sherbert-Yoder is the correct understanding of the Free Exer- 
cise Clause.loO) Fourth and finally, on May 24, 1993, the 
House of Representatives passed the Religious Freedom Resto- 
ration Act of 1993, which would reinstate the "compelling state 
interest" standard and is intended to undo the Smith decision. 
There appears to be substantial support in the Senate as 
well.lol 
Thus, the doctrinal interpretation of the Free Exercise 
Clause began by adopting Jefferson's Enlightenment-oriented 
view and ignoring the quite different view of Madison and the 
radical protestants. This was an understanding compatible 
with an equality based paradigm. Over the fifty-year period 
beginning with Cantwell in 1940, however, the Court developed 
(but did not consistently follow) a well articulated doctrine 
aligned more with the Madisonian and radical protestant un- 
derstanding-a doctrine clearly reflecting an understanding of 
the clause as mapping out an area of liberty and freedom from 
government impingement. With Smith, a five member majority 
turned away from the liberty paradigm-seemingly, although 
not clearly, turning back to an equal treatment mod- 
ello2-and left free exercise doctrine in an undeveloped, un- 
clear state. And now, with the resignation of one of those five, 
and with Justice Souter's declaration of disagreement, future 
interpretation of the clause is both open to substantial change 
and difficult to  predict. 
100. Justices Scalia, K e ~ e d y ,  Thomas, Stevens and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
support the Smith rule; Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Blackmun (and possibly 
future Justice Ginsburg) support the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine. 
101. For a discussion of the Act, see Douglas Laycock's article in this sympo- 
sium. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 221. 
102. This term's opinion in the Hialeah case confirmed this understanding. 
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court relied upon Smith for "the general proposi- 
tion that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justiiied by 
a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of 
burdening a particular religious practice," and overturned the Hialeah laws because 
they were neither formally neutral nor generally applicable. 113 S. Ct. at 2222. 
And Justice Blackmun in concurrence stated Smith was "wrongly decided, because 
it ignored the value of religious freedom as an affirmative individual liberty and 
treated the Free Exercise Clause as no more than an antidiscrimination principle." 
Id. at 2250. 
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E. Values, Policy and Prudence: 
The "Why" of the Free Exercise Clause 
Why religion? The First Amendment singles out religion 
for both a special benefit-the guaranty of "free exerci~e'~-and 
a special detriment-the prohibition on "establishment." No 
other aspect of life is similarly singled out in the Constitution, 
not science, education, art, philosophy, family relations, or 
agriculture. Commentators have begun to ask about the Free 
Exercise Clause: Why should there be a special freedom for 
religious conduct?103 When I first heard that question put at 
an academic conference on the religion clauses, I thought the 
answer, at least in constitutional terms, was obvious. But per- 
haps it is not nearly so obvious as I had thought. How else can 
one explain the contrast between the absolute language of the 
clause and the Supreme Court's stingy interpretation? How 
else can one explain cases like Quaring and Smith? There is a 
strong current of equality in American values, and equality is 
particularly identified with the Constitution. It thus goes 
against our grain t o  grant religious believers legal preference 
(such as exemption from valid legal regulations) that others do 
not receive. And so the grain is often followed despite a consti- 
tutional pointer in the other direction which could hardly be 
clearer. 
Why religion? The answer, t o  a large and meaningful ex- 
tent, is obvious. That answer is: text and history. Both, I sub- 
mit, are remarkably clear. And when those primary sources of 
constitutional interpretation are clear, that alone is an impor- 
tant reason. The "simple history" discussed briefly above pro- 
vides a rather succinct explanation of why the framers saw 
religion as sufficiently different to carve out two explicit consti- 
tutional provisions concerning it. Their history taught them 
that religion meant trouble, serious blood-spilling trouble, when 
it was mixed with government. 
Their purpose was to try t o  ensure civil peace in regard to 
religious questions. Their solution was to try to separate gov- 
ernment and religion, and the recognition that the separation 
had t o  go both ways: religion could not interfere with the mech- 
103. See, e.g., John H .  Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 
18 CONN. L. REV. 779 (1986); Michael E. Smith, !Z%e Special Place of Religion in 
the Constitution, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 83. 
71 CONFLICTING PARADIGMS 39 
anisms of the state, but the mechanisms of the state must not 
interfere with the garden of the church. From Hobbes and 
Locke through Jefferson and Madison there was lasting con- 
cern and thought, on the Enlightenment side, about achieving 
civil peace in regard to  religion.lOl And this was mirrored, al- 
beit to  a lesser extent, on the radical protestant side with con- 
cern that religion not become enmeshed in the profane business 
of the state. The church must leave the state alone, and the 
state must leave the church alone. 
(The "why" in historical terms is clear; it is the "how" that 
is difficult. The directive in the First Amendment is clear 
enough; it is carrying it out which is so difficult.'" Religion 
and state cannot be kept separate for each deals with everyday 
life in the real world, as the cases from Reynolds through 
Quaring and Bob Jones demonstrate. Keeping the civil peace in 
light of the explosiveness of religious beliefs is a clear reason, 
and reason enough, for the religion clauses. That the elabora- 
tion of the directive through precedent and doctrine is difficult 
is not a warrant to ignore the clear message of the text and its 
historical context.) 
The nature of religion explains both this explosiveness and 
the fact that it does not fit comfortably within the processes of 
a democratic polity. Religious beliefs tend to  be (1) strongly 
held; (2) of special significance t o  the believer, often relating t o  
his or her basic identity and understanding of both self and the 
reality beyond self; and (3) beyond verification or testing by 
rational discourse or other decision making or knowledge gath- 
ering processes such as voting or scientific investigation. Major- 
ity rule does not f i t  well with those kinds of beliefs; compro- 
mise does not fit a great deal better; and imposition by legal 
authority from above on such beliefs is not likely to  be taken 
with equanimity. Religion is differentieven singular (what 
else compares?)lo6-and that singularity is perfectly congru- 
ent with both the text and history of the Free Exercise Clause. 
104. ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AW 19 
(1985). But cf. Smith, supra note 37. 
105. The practical difficulties, although asserted summarily more than seriously 
examined, were a major part of Justice Scalia's justifcation for the abandonment of 
the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine in the Smith opinion. See 494 U.S. at 882-90. 
106. John Garvey compares it to insanity. Garvey, supra note 103, at 798. Al- 
though I think that comparison is not particularly apt, it is suggestive of the domi- 
nant secular view of our age and of how far we have travelled from the 1787 
understandings. 
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That singularity is also consistent with a constitutional deci- 
sion to  treat religion differently, t o  give it substantial shelter 
from decisions reached through majoritarian democratic pro- 
cesses, substantial shelter from otherwise valid law. (Given the 
singular nature of religion, the clarity of the text, and the co- 
herence of the historical background, what may be difficult to  
understand is the disinclination to grant the shelter. The an- 
swer is the strong pull of equality mentioned above, the diffi- 
culty in framing a doctrine with workable limits [no freedom 
can be absolute], and other factors mentioned below.) 
The discussion so far in this section explains the special 
place of religion in the polity for the most part on the basis of 
the threat religion poses to civil peace, a negative cast attribut- 
able primarily to the Enlightenment view. But the singularity 
of religion contains a promise-a positive cast-as well which 
also supports its place in the First Amendment and generous 
exemptions for believers. That promise, for at least some be- 
lievers, is a life lived in a dimension beyond the ordinary, a life 
with connections and obligations different in kind from the 
physical and social world we all share; a promise of life lived in 
accordance with transcendent truth and with a profound 
connection to  that truth. Those who have an intimation of that 
promise, who live at least part of their lives with such connec- 
tions, tend to  give it an importance, a valuation, an allegiance, 
above all others. It tends to give a meaning to life that those of 
us without profound connection to that dimension do not share. 
That meaning, that connection, is often perceived, by both 
believer and unbeliever, as good. It is perceived as making life 
better. If she had a choice (and sometimes choice is involved) 
the believer would choose that life over one without the tran- 
scendent connection. And many who do not believe would also 
choose that life if they could. 
The threat and the promise arise from the same phenome- 
non: religious experience. The strength and profundity and 
higher allegiance of religion threaten the peace of the state; but 
they also promise a life of a different and better kind for the 
believer. Why would the state want to impinge on that life if it 
could avoid it? The believer suffers a terrible choice; the state 
puts itself at risk. What is to be gained by putting the believer 
to  a test of allegiances? 
There are two simple answers. First, the state gains what- 
ever the object is of the law or regulation which is impinging 
on the believer: all the ubiquitous purposes of common action 
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through government. Is that gain worth the loss and the risk? I 
submit that it is usually not. The Free Exercise Clause seems 
to  be a determination on the constitutional level that it is not. 
The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine, with its identification of "overrid- 
ing" and "compelling" governmental interests as the necessary 
ground for limiting free exercise and with its search for 'less 
drastic means" (which do not impinge on believers) to reach 
those interests, appeared to  rest on that same conclusion. 
Moreover, under that doctrine most of the purposes of govern- 
mental action could still be reached: application of the Free 
Exercise Clause created an exemption for the believer; the law 
remained valid for all others,lO' and thus remained generally 
effective. lo' 
Second, the state gains equality in the application of its 
law, a central value, a constitutional value. But the factors 
discussed above suggest that religion is different in a signifi- 
cant way: the person whose religious life is invaded by a legal 
provision is not similarly situated to the person for whom the 
provision has no such effect. The impact of the legal provision 
on those differently situated persons is not equal. Also, the risk 
to the state in enforcing the law is not equal. Thus there is 
good reason for unequal application of the law, and it is a con- 
stitutionally sufficient reason under the Equal Protection 
Clause. (This leaves aside for the moment the fact that this 
particular inequality is based upon the explicit text of the Con- 
stitution-the Free Exercise Clause.) 
There is another value to religion, another reason for treat- 
ing it differently. The added dimension of a religious life in- 
cludes not only a profound connection to the truth, but also 
characteristically a profound connection to  the community de- 
fmed by allegiance t o  that truth.log Thus, part of the promise 
of religion is transcendent meaning in the communal life as 
well as the individual life. Many find in our current law, in- 
cluding constitutional law, an overemphasis on individualism 
107. Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. 
Constitution, 18 CONN. L. REV. 739, 761-78 (1986). 
108. If the exemption would be applicable to a substantial minority, it is unlike- 
ly the legal provision would have been enaded to begin with. See Pepper, Taking, 
supra note 37, at 313-15; McCo~eu, supra note 5, at 1147-48. Thus the exemption 
doctrine is unlikely to substantially undermine the effectiveness of government. 
109. See, e.g., Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construc- 
tion and Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1468, 1472-74; Gedicks, supra 
note 50, at 106-15 and other sources cited supm note 50. 
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and autonomy and a corresponding insufficient recognition of 
and support for community and c o ~ e c t i o n . ' ~ ~  Given the well 
recognized communal dimension in most religions, the Free 
Exercise Clause is the preeminent exception: the value of corn- 
rnunity and connection are given explicit constitutional protec- 
tion. Only here is communal activity (other than governmental 
activity) given constitutional shelter."' The more one is con- 
cerned with creating legal and constitutional support for corn- 
munal life, the more one will be inclined toward an interpreta- 
tion which gives the Free Exercise Clause power and vitali- 
ty. '12 
F. The Synergism of Text, History, Structure and Policy 
Focusing on the speech and press provisions of the First 
Amendment, and in doing so finding protection of communica- 
tive expression to be the central concept, William Marshall 
believes that the equality paradigm provides the proper inter- 
pretation for the Free Exercise Clause. Under this view, only 
expressive religious conduct is protected from governmental 
imposition by the Clause, and only to the same extent it would 
be under the speech and press clauses if it had no religious 
content or m~tivation."~ Professor Marshall has elaborated . 
arguments against the understanding of each of the factors 
presented above, and each of these arguments has some 
weight. But the arguments have a distinct ad hoc sense about 
them, in that they attack each basis with whatever appears a t  
hand-in the nature of a legal brief-rather than cohering 
110. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: RIE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PO- 
LITICAL DISCOURSE (1991). 
111. Federalism, the existence of the states, is the other protection for commu- 
nity in the Constitution. But few would think the states now, or at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution, sufficiently small to support the values associated 
with community life. 
112. Religion is not so singular in regard to its communal dimension as it is in 
the ways discussed above, and thus the equality problem is more salient. Other 
areas of life-families for example-share a fundamental communal dimension. But 
religion is a place to begin, and it has a textual basis in the Constitution. 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has felt the need to create constitutional 
shelter for aspects of family life even without a textual basis. See, e.g,, Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494 (1977) (right to live with extended family); Loving V. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967) (right to marry); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (liberty to 
direct upbringing of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to 
pursue a legitimate vocation); TRIBE, supra note 33, at  chs. 15-20. 
113. Marshall, The Case Against the CompeUed Exemption, supra note 6. 
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together.ll4 I do not intend to  address each of these argu- 
ments or attempt to rebut each. What I want to point out here 
is that such an approach neglects the way in which the factors 
developed above interact with and support one another. In a 
nutshell, Professor Marshall's argument is that text and histo- 
ry do not make it clear enough that the Free Exercise Clause 
was intended to extend to protection from otherwise valid, 
religiously neutral laws. When it comes to the area of val- 
ues/policy/prudence, however, his argument is that religion is 
not sufficiently unique; other non-religious bases for action 
sometimes share some of the aspects that justify special consti- 
tutional treatment for religion. What this view neglects is that 
religion is unique in the way i t  combines the val- 
ues/policy/prudence reasons with an explicit textual basis and 
substantial, concordant historical and structural reasons. 
The text of the First Amendment includes what appears t o  
be a clear and near absolute declaration of a zone of liberty for 
religious "exercise." That plain reading seems extreme and 
difficult to reconcile with notions of government in general and 
equality in particular, however, until the structural logic of 
such a position is explained. Further, when examined in the 
light of both the long- and short-term history preceding the 
drafting and adoption of the religion clauses, both the text and 
the structural logic which support it make a great deal of 
sense. In particular, the perspective of the radical protestants, 
their political importance in the evolution of the separation of 
church and state in the colonies, and the articulated views of 
James Madison, tend to give a distinct coherence to this combi- 
nation of text, structure and history.l15 What Professor 
Marshall's perspective and criticism leave out is this syner- 
114. For example, the argument concerning the. fact that the Free Exercise 
Clause is rendered close to content-less by an equality based interpretation is an- 
swered by pointing out that the Clause is left with some imaginable meaning; and 
that subsequent passage and development of the Equal Protection Clause can hard- 
ly determine the original or current meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. Mar- 
shall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, at 373-74. 
Marshall's argument from history is, essentially, that it is too unclear to  be deter- 
minative. Id. at 375-79. (McConnell, supra note 22, has provided substantial histor- 
ical evidence to support exemption doctrine, but Marshall still has a significant 
point.) Note that the textual and historical arguments do not join or create mo- 
mentum for one another; and this is what I mean by ad hoc. The sense is of an 
effort to  find something wrong or weak with each argument, whatever that might 
be. 
115. This is similar to what Professor Steven Smith calls the "religious justifica- 
tion" for religious freedom. See Smith, supra note 37, at 154-66. 
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gism: those aspects of the factors which support a liberty para- 
digm, which support exemptions for religious conduct from 
neutral law, interact with and support one another in  a way 
which makes the whole substantially stronger than the parts. 
Professor Marshall notes, for example, that it is not only 
religion which gives some persons strong and sometimes ada- 
mant bases for action. In addressing the kind of argument 
presented in part I1.E. above, he emphasizes that religion is 
not "uniq~e.""~ (While it is true that other bases of belief 
occasiondly can result in  similar depth and emotion, it is prob- 
ably also true that religion as a category is unique: such 
strength and depth and resistance to rational compromise are 
associated with religion with far greater frequency than with 
any other basis for action. Thus religion is in the aggregate 
unique, even if there are numerous cases of similar results in 
the absence of a religious basis.) In addition, he points out that 
many religious believers do not hold their beliefs with the 
strength i d  unwillingness to compromise which makes reli- 
gion arguably unique, and therefore exemptions for all sincere 
religious believers from neutral laws would be "overbroad." 
That is, some who would get the benefit of the exemptions 
would not have the depth or kind of belief which justifies the 
exemption."' But this aspect of Professor Marshall's argu- 
ment leaves out one factor of primary significance: the text. 
The First Amendment expressly protects religious conduct; it 
does not expressly protect any other bases for conduct.l18 
116. Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, at 383 
(providing the example of one unavailable for work not because of Sabbath obliga- 
tions or religious objections to work in an armaments factory, Thomas v. Review 
Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (following Sherbert u. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)), but 
"due to strong convictions about parental obligations") (footnote omitted). 
117. Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, a t  384. 
This problem is addressed, in part, in Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at 327-28. In 
the end, Professor Marshall admits that while "no one fador" is conclusive, "the 
aggregation of a number of fadorsn may mean that religion is unique and there- 
fore "entitled to special protection." Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled 
Exemption, supra note 6, at 385-86 (commenting on Garvey, supra note 103). 
Professor Marshall appears recently to have come to a firmer conclusion that reli- 
gion is unique, or at least sufficiently different to require special constitutional and 
political treatment. See William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 843 (1993) [hereinafter Marshall, The Other Side of Religion]. His 
observations and conclusions there appear quite consistent with the discussion of 
religion in part 1I.E. 
118. It does expressly protect other, inherently limited, categories of conduct: 
speech, press, and assembly for redress of grievances. See supra the beginning 
section of part 1I.A. and the concluding two paragraphs of part 1I.C. 
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That the reasons for this special protection may not apply t o  
each instance of religious conduct, and that other conduct may 
occasionally share the special nature of religious motivation, 
would not seem to  be of great import in light of the express 
singling out of religion in the text of the Amendment. (We are 
not dealing here with a large and conceptually vague provision 
such as "equal protection" or "due process.") Thus Professor 
Marshall's argument leaves out the connection, the mutual 
support, between the policy and values basis and the explicit 
textual support for a special liberty paradigm singling out reli- 
gion for special treatment. 
Once he has left the subjects of text and history, Professor 
Marshall's argument tends to forget them. For example, at the 
conclusion of one argument11g he states: "Again, those advo- 
cating a free exercise exemption for religious groups must con- 
vincingly argue that religious exercise is special."'" Striking- 
ly, the text of the First Amendment, which unequivocally sin- 
gles out religious "exercise" for unique treatment, is not re- 
ferred to and appears to  have been forgotten, or to  have become 
somehow insignificant. The values and policy part of Professor 
Marshall's argument thus reads as if the First Amendment had 
not yet been written.121 As such, if presented in a textual and 
119. Responding to an equality aspect of the liberty paradigm, to be developed 
briefly infra at part 1V.A. 
120. Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6,  at 380. 
121. Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, at 379- 
86. In this section he quotes Professor Mark Tushnet, another participant in this 
symposium: "In a pluralistic society with crosscutting group memberships, the over- 
all distribution of benefits and burdens is likely to be reasonably fair." Id. at 380 
(quoting Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Du- 
bitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1700 (1988)). This is clearly written as if there were 
no Bill of Rights, and asserts no need for one. Interestingly, it is similar to one of 
the reasons given by Madison for the proposition that the union of the states 
would have a 
tendency to break and control the violence of fadion . . . . [Tlhe greater 
number of citizens and extent of territory . . . renders factious combina- 
tions less to be dreaded . . . . Extend the sphere, and you take in a 
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a 
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of 
other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more mcult 
for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to a d  in unison 
with each other. 
THE FEDERALIST N0.10 (James Madison). 
Whether or not one agrees with this argument in the context of the communica- 
tions and politics of the contemporary United States, or with Tushnet's similar 
reason, both were clearly rejeded by the adoption of the Bill of Rights as an ex- 
plicit protection from majority rule in regard to those matters covered by the first 
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historical vacuum-that is if we had no Bill of Rights and were 
considering what to include in one-it might well present a 
persuasive argument that we ought to confine religious freedom 
to an ambit identical with freedom of speech only. But we are 
not in such a vacuum. The combination and interaction of the 
textual, historical, structural and values/policy/prudence foun- 
dations for a liberty-based interpretation, which grants shelter 
to religious conduct from formally neutral law, is substantially 
more powerful than it appears from the perspective of criticism 
which considers each basis separately. And in doing constitu- 
tional law we seek one interpretation of one set of words which 
will function as a guiding rule or principlethe basis for the 
development of coherent doctrine. We are not looking for and 
separately evaluating a textual, an historical, a structural, and 
a policy Constitution. We use all these perspectives as interpre- 
tive tools, as alternative angles of vision, to assist in a unified 
understanding of a particular legal provision.122 
When the Constitution and First Amendment were drafted, 
the rational Enlightenment approach to the world was relative- 
ly new and still struggling with the theretofore dominant reli- 
gious understanding. The Constitution is itself a landmark in 
the movement toward the dominance of a secular, rational view 
of living in the world. In the ensuing two hundred years, secu- 
larization has dramatically increased and become clearly domi- 
nant in Western intellectual and legal thought.lB With this 
ten amendments. Indeed, adoption of such a list of freedoms was an explicit re- 
quest by several states attendant to (and an implicit condition for) their vote to 
ratify. See MILLER, supra note 21, at 119-21. 
In an October 17, 1788 letter to Jefferson, Madison claimed that he had "al- 
ways been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply 
powers not meant to be included in the enumeration." He expressed concern, how- 
ever, that "the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite lati- 
tude," specifying in that regard "the rights of conscience in particular." 5 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 269-75 (This is the famous letter in which Madison 
goes on to discuss the "inefficacy of a bill of rights," to refer to them as mere 
"parchment barriers," and to discuss the fad that under the Constitution, as op- 
posed to previous governments, "the danger of oppression lies in the interested 
majorities of the people rather than in usurped a d s  of Government"). 
122. See supra sources cited at note 8. 
123. That secularization has become dominant in these arenas does not mean 
that it is necessarily dominant in society generally or in the lives of most individu- 
als, although it may be. Professor Steven Smith provides substantial sociological 
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paradigm shift, approaching the religion clauses from the En- 
lightenment view becomes close to automatic: the protection of 
government from the pernicious influence of religion is easy to 
grasp, whereas the special protection for religious conduct looks 
like unjustifiable discrimination. The Establishment Clause 
remains coherent, but it becomes difficult to give content to the 
Free Exercise Clause. The threat of religion is perceived more 
easily than its promise, and religion becomes marginal. 
Similarly, with the transition to the liberal paradigm for 
most legal thought, the focus on the individual as the locus of 
rights and legal status makes it harder to perceive intermedi- 
ate groups or community as independent bearers of legal rights 
and status. From this direction also the Enlightenment view of 
the Establishment Clause as a primary protection for the gov- 
ernment (and indirectly for individuals) comes to  predominate 
over a view concerned with and protective of religious commu- 
nities-the latter a view more consistent with the republican 
tradition. 
We are thus far removed from the framers' context in 
which strong constitutional protection for religion, including 
religious communities, made intuitive sense. It is no great 
surprise, therefore, that until Sherbert and Yoder the Free 
Exercise Clause was reduced to the other First Amendment 
freedoms, in effect given no independent content.'* For these 
same reasons, it is also unsurprising that the Court found it 
diflkult to consistently apply the doctrine announced in those 
cases, and has now returned to a view which provides religious 
freedom little or no special protection. 
Contemporary interpretation and application of the Free 
Exercise Clause thus faces a choice. One can read the clauses 
from Jefferson's perspective, an Enlightenment view that sees 
religion primarily as threat. Or one can turn to Madison (a 
different Enlightenment view) and to the radical protestants, 
data suggesting that religion is a live force in most American lives. He appears to 
grant the dominance of the secular view in political, intellectual, and legal thought, 
but prefers to refer to this as the privatization of religion rather than the secular- . 
ization of these arenas. Smith, supra note 37, at 169-80. Otherwise, the view of 
the Free Exercise Clause presented there and that argued here are, for the most 
part, consistent and compatible. 
124. Tushnet, supra note 51, at 729-38. I remain uncomfortable with the ambi- 
guity of the usage "liberal" in this context, but will employ it nonetheless. In the 
more generic usage of riberal," I am not sure it can be identified more with an 
individualistic than a comrnunitarian approach to law. 
125. See supra text accompanying notes 56-65. 
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and see religion as  both a threat and a promise.126 The Jeffer- 
sonian view leads to a strong Establishment Clause, and to a 
Free Exercise Clause with no contemporary effect. Religious 
conduct is protected if it falls within the protections of the 
speech, press, or association provisions of the First Amend- 
ment, but not otherwise.12' The Madisonian and radical prot- 
estant views lead to a strong Free Exercise Clause while not 
denigrating from a strong Establishment Clause. The absolute 
text of the Free Exercise Clause is hard to reconcile with the 
restrictive view, as is much of the historical context. An under- 
standing of the Free Exercise Clause under which it has vigor 
and effect, on the other hand, fits well with both text and his- 
torical context. It also makes sense from several perspectives 
on the structure and theory of the Constitution in general and 
the First Amendment in particular. The values, policies and 
prudence suggested by the text, its history, and a significant 
part of the theory and structure of the Cons t i t~ t ion '~~  also 
point in this direction. 
Choosing to take the text seriously, choosing to interpret 
the Free Exercise Clause as granting substantial protection for 
religious conduct from governmental regulation, is only a first 
step. Such an orientation turns religion clause jurisprudence 
down a road which requires a great deal of doctrinal develop- 
ment. A freedom of such large scope cannot be absolute, yet the 
clause is phrased without limit. Neither history nor structure 
provides clear limit or gloss. The construction of limits is a 
daunting task and may explain, a t  least in part, the Supreme 
Court's delay in taking the initial step and its apparent incon- 
sistency in application of the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine. And it is 
the primary reason presented in the Smith opinion for undoing 
that d 0 ~ t r i n e . l ~ ~  
Charting the contours that a vigorous but workable free 
126. See supra parts IIA. & B. 
127. See Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6; 
Marshall, Free Exercise as Free Expression, supra note 6. 
128. It cannot be denied that si-cant theoretical and structural aspects of the 
Constitution support the Jeffersonian approach. As mentioned supra, text accompa- 
nying note 56, the First Amendment can be read as a unit protecting fundamen- 
tally communicative activity only (including religious speech, press and possibly 
worship to the extent it includes symbolic speech, but no other kinds of religious 
activity). Also, as mentioned in part II.E., the emphasis of our constitutional tradi- 
tion on equality does not square well, on Grst thought, with a constitutional protec- 
tion for religious conduct that extends to no other kind of conduct. 
129. 494 U.S. at 882-90. 
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exercise doctrine might take is a necessary task for constitu- 
tional interpretation. I t  is a larger task than I am willing to 
undertake in this article.1s0 To give a sense of the scope and 
viability of the task, however, a few of the more prominent 
difficulties that must be faced in the application of a robust 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause are discussed briefly 
below. 
IV. A QUARTET OF DIFFICULTIES 
A. The Establishment Clause, Equality, 
and Exemptions fiom Neutral Law 
The presence of the Establishment Clause complicates free 
exercise doctrine, and the Free Exercise Clause likewise com- 
plicates Establishment Clause doctrine. As noted above, the 
First Amendment singles religion out for both a special detri- 
ment and a special benefit. If the Establishment Clause prohib- 
its all legal preferences for religion, the Free Exercise Clause is 
itself a violation. Likewise, if the Free Exercise Clause prohib- 
its all government detriments to religion, the Establishment 
Clause is itself a ~ io la t ion . '~~  In an  age of ubiquitous govern- 
mental regulation and subsidy, this has become a serious com- 
plication for First Amendment analysis. Either clause can be 
interpreted so expansively as to leave little content for the 
other. And whatever interpretation is given one clause, a com- 
patible interpretation can be given the other. 
There are a number of ways of approaching this tension 
between the clauses. Any resolution must also face the connect- 
ed question of what space will be left between the clauses for 
discretionary governmental action neither compelled by the 
Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment 
Clause.ls2 These approaches will not be canvassed here. I will 
pause, however, for a brief focus on exemptions and establish- 
ment. Granting believers exemptions from neutral legal regula- 
130. Some of my earlier work has made some suggestions in this area. See, e.g., 
Pepper, Taking, supm note 37, at 325-36; Pepper, Conundrum, supra note 3. See 
also J. Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327 
(1969); Marc Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning Point? 
1966 WIS. L. REV. 217. 
131. Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling 
the Conflict, 41 U. Prm. L. REV. 673 (1980); Pepper, Altemtives, supm note 3, at 
345-52. 
132. McConnell, supra note 50. 
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tions that apply to  others is a benefit for religion based upon 
an explicitly religious criterion, and thus can be seen as a vio- 
lation of the Establishment Clause. (This is the route one takes 
t o  find an equality paradigm to be the appropriate reading of 
the Free Exercise Clause.) But there is nothing to  distinguish 
that conclusion from one which reads the entire Free Exercise 
Clause out of the Constitution, for that Clause also is a benefit 
for religion based upon an explicit textual religious criterion: 
"free exercise of religion." There is a structural understanding 
of the clauses, however, with which exemptions are perfectly 
congruent; and this understanding is perfectly congruent with 
the Free Exercise Clause as a guaranty of substantive rather 
than merely formal equality. 
Assume for the moment that the absolute language of the 
Free Exercise Clause is premised on the Madisonian notion, 
sketched above,'= that there is no consent to  be governed in 
regard to matters of religion, and that the clause is the "social 
contract" to  that effect incorporated into the Constitution. This 
is perfectly in tune with the understanding of the Bill of Rights 
as a charter protecting the minority from the majority. When 
combined with an effective Establishment Clause, minority and 
majority will be in the same position in regard to the nexus 
between religious practice and government action. The clauses 
together prevent the majority from purposefully using govern- 
ment to favor itself or disfavor minorities in religious matters 
(in other words, separation of church and state). But the major- 
ity is also unlikely to  unintentionally impinge on its own reli- 
gious beliefs (with which it is quite familiar), whereas it is 
quite likely to do so in the case of small religious minorities. 
Consider for a moment, would states require photos on driver's 
licenses if Jewish or Catholic religious beliefs prohibited use of 
- 
photographs? ls4 
To truly equalize minority and majority (or a coalition of 
minorities) in regard t o  the relations between religion and 
government, the clauses must therefore protect against not 
only intentional discrimination on religious matters, but also 
the inadvertent. Thus the need for, and constitutional logic of, 
exemptions for believers from neutral governmental actions 
133. See supra part 1I.C. 
134. See Pepper, Conundrum, supra note 3, at 296-99 & 11.159; Pepper, Taking, 
supm note 37, at 312-16; Laycock, supra note 5, at 14-15; McConnell, supm note 
5; at 1147-49. 
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that remain valid as to  others.135 And this constitutional logic 
and structure leave the Establishment Clause intact and with a 
strong independent role of its own. In fact it leaves essentially 
all of the Court's current Establishment Clause doctrine in- 
tact. ls6 
The inadvertence of the government's religious discrimina- 
tion, and the equalization of majority and minority, lead us to 
the question of perspective: the government's conduct is inno- 
cent and nondiscriminatory in plan and intent; but in effect it 
is oppressive to the minority. If we are interpreting a docu- 
ment, such as the Bill of Rights, designed to protect minority 
from majority, the question of which perspective is appropriate 
would seem easy to answer. Moreover, the text, history, struc- 
ture and values implicated in interpretation of the clauses, 
discussed above, all point toward this perspective as well. Thus 
substantive equality-a reading of the religion clauses which 
leaves both politically dominant and politically weak religious 
groups equal in their inability to use the government (law) to 
assist their own religion or burden others-makes the most 
sense as an interpretation of the Bill of Rights, a document 
designed to protect minorities and individuals from democracy 
(the majority or a coalition of minorities).ls7 
one other, related equality concern ought to be mentioned 
here. Seeing in the First Amendment primarily a protection for 
speech, Professor Marshall suggests that a liberty paradigm for 
religion gives it an improper advantage in the marketplace of 
ideas that is inconsistent with his understanding of the free 
135. Galanter, supra note 130, at 291; Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at 312-15; 
Comment, A Non-Conflict Approach to the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 131 
U. PA. L. REV. 1175, 1197-208 (1983). 
136. It should probably be mentioned, as well, that the view articulated in this 
paper which leads to a vigorous, powerful Free Exercise Clause can also lead to a 
similarly effective Establishment Clause. Personally, while I believe Establishment 
Clause doctrine leaves a great deal to be desired, P am not convinced that very 
many of the Supreme Court's cases have been wrongly decided. And most of those 
that I believe are wrong, such as Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US. 668 (1984) (the 
nativity scene case), and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1982) (tax deductions for 
parents for some parochial school expenses), err on the side of failing to find an 
establishment violation where one has occurred. 
137. Justice Souter's significant concurring opinion this term in the Hialeah case, 
see text accompanying note 97, identifies the Smith decision with formal neutrality 
and the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine with substantive neutrality, bringing that terminol- 
ogy into the free exercise opinions of the Court for the first time, and arguing the 
latter as the correct interpretation of the free exercise clause. 113 S. Ct. at 2240- 
42. 
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speech provisions of the Amendment.ls8 From this perspec- 
tive, if protection for religious communication is greater than 
for other communication, religion is given an  advantage over 
other bases for conduct in the free competition of ideas. This 
difficulty is easily remedied, however, if the First Amendment 
is read as providing religious communication (speech and press) 
the same degree of protection as other core areas of protected 
expression. To the extent religious conduct is only communica- 
tion (speech or press) otherwise covered by the Amendment, 
there appears to be an overlap of protection, and no need or 
reason to provide extra protection for religious speech over 
political speech. Only when the religious conduct is not primar- 
ily communicative (and thus would not be protected under the 
speech and press clauses) is there need or reason for a Free 
Exercise Clause. (And thus, of course, the significance of a 
clause that uses a word-"exercise"-which so clearly denotes 
conduct of all kinds, conduct beyond the scope of communica- 
tion, conduct which is neither speech nor press.) 
Polygamy, ingestion of peyote, refusal to carry a picture or 
to send one's children to school, all may have communicative or 
symbolic elements; but they are not primarily speech, and 
would not fall under the current interpretations of the scope of 
the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment. When 
the conduct is primarily communicative, however, there is no 
need to  discriminate between religious and non-religious con- 
duct. In  Widmar u. Vincent,13' the Supreme Court held that 
because the University of Missouri had created an open forum 
for student speech on campus, it could not discriminate against 
religious speech (interpreting a worship service by students to 
be speech). In doing so, it held that the Free Speech Clause 
(and equal treatment under the open forum doctrine), rather 
than the Establishment, Free Exercise, or Equal Protection 
Clauses, was the appropriate standard. Such a view directly 
meets Professor Marshall's concerns in the area of speech, and 
is the prevailing view on the C o ~ r t . " ~  (And even if i t  were 
not, it must be remembered that there is no Establishment 
138. Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, at 388- 
94. 
139. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
140. In addition to Widmar, see Heffkon v. International Soc'y for Krishna Con- 
sciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981); cf. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 
(1989). The Court has left this somewhat less clear than it was before through 
dicta in the Smith case. See Laycock, supra note 5, at 44-47. 
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Clause for speech. Thus government is not prohibited from 
favoritism in regard to ideas and bases for conduct in its own 
speech. Public schools are free to teach that capitalism is better 
than communism, respect and concern for the environment 
better than despoliation, and they commonly do so. There is no 
requirement that the government be neutral or treat all ideas 
equally in its own c~mmunication.)'~~ 
A First Amendment doctrine which treats religious commu- 
nication equally with other communication is not enough from 
Professor Marshall's view, however, because the Free Exercise 
Clause can still be read to give preferential treatment to reli- 
gious conduct beyond speech, and this violates his understand- 
ing of the First Amendment in its entirety as an "equality of 
ideas" pro~ision.'~~ There is some validity to  this concern, 
some real unfairness in giving advantage to  those who act from 
religious motivation. (Although, as pointed out a t  the beginning 
of this article, that unfairness varies greatly depending upon 
the context in which the claim arises.) But it must be noted 
that this is not an unfairness in giving a preference where the 
Constitution is concerned with the marketplace of ideas: the 
speech and press clauses. And it must be emphasized that there 
is no "equality of ideas" clause in the Bill of Rights, while there 
is an explicit Free Exercise Clause. Moreover, the government 
favors some ideas and disfavors others in all its vast criminal 
and civil regulation of conduct. It criminalizes theft; it encour- 
ages charitable contributions (and defines what counts as char- 
itable).143 When Professor Marshall moves his argument from 
speech to conduct, it conflicts directly with the ubiquitous gov- 
ernmental regulation of conduct in this society. In respect to 
religion, government merely does so at a more fundamental 
level of legal preference, by including freedom of religion in its 
basic charter of rights. 
B. Drawing Lines, Neutrality and Discrimination 
Applying the Free Exercise Clause under the Sherbert- 
Yoder doctrine requires that lines be drawn and discrimina- 
tions be made. The sincere must be distinguished from the 
141. See generally MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983). 
142. Marshall, m e  Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, at 392- 
94. This view resonates with the structural unity of the First Amendment articu- 
lated in the text accompanying note 49. 
143. Cf. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). 
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fraudulent. (For example, someone who objects to mandatory 
education for non-religious reasons may be tempted to claim 
the religious exemption granted the Amish.) Instances where 
religious claimants cannot be exempted from government regu- 
lations because of the extent of damage resulting to important 
government concerns must be distinguished from situations 
where the exemption inflicts tolerable damage to the govern- 
mental interest. (For example, a person who asserted religious 
objection to carrying any driver's license or alternative official 
identification would present a difficult judgment even under a 
vigorous free exercise interpretation; a situation far more prob- 
lematic than presented by Mrs. Quaring.'") When such dis- 
tinctions are drawn there is a lack of equality not just between 
those with a religious basis for exemption and those without, 
but also amongst those asserting religious claims. 
Some justices of the Supreme Court have been unwilling to 
adopt a doctrine under which such lines must be drawn, per- 
ceiving that the basic command of the religion clauses is neu- 
trality: that government not discriminate between religions. 
But if the Free Exercise Clause is to have modern content, such 
lines must be drawn. If sincerity cannot be considered, or if no 
interest of the government justifies impingement on religion, 
we are close to an  absolute freedom. Little if any content will 
be given to such a n  unlimited freedom. Thus, on the claim of 
avoiding the danger of the kinds of religious discrimination the 
clauses were designed to prevent, these justices end up grant- 
ing essentially no meaningful protection for religious conduct 
other than against overt religiously discriminatory government 
action.145 To protect those claimants who might lose because 
144. Automobiles are dangerous instrumentalities; unrestricted use by unidentifi- 
able persons may create too much risk to tolerate, too complete a preference for 
religion, particularly in light of the non-consenting third parties who may be 
harmed. On the other hand, it might be that "less drastic means" could be created 
by a sufficiently flexible government even for this situation. Those who had a gen- 
uine religious need not to carry a license (sincerity would be an important dimen- 
sion of such a case) might register with the state, provide identifying information, 
and sign a waiver granting, in any situation in which a driver's license is normally 
required by law enforcement personnel, permission for detention until identification 
could otherwise be confirmed. This would certainly be a signiFicant administrative 
burden on the state, but because the number of people claiming the exemption is 
likely to be very small, the occasions for detention would likely be extremely rare. 
(Such a waiver would have the incidental effect of helping to test the sincerity of 
the religious claim.) 
145. For a more extended discussion of the sincerity issue and of the positions 
of Justices White and Stevens, see Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at 325-31. 
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they are incorrectly found to be insincere, or the government 
interest is found too important, all religious exemptions must 
fall. To protect the feelings of that  subgroup of religious claim- 
ants, all persons whose religious conduct is harmed by neutral 
government action must suffer.'" (One is reminded of de- 
stroying the village to save it.) 
This is simply another facet of the Enlightenment-oriented 
approach which, seeing religion primarily as threat rather than 
promise, elevates the Establishment Clause protection of the 
government from religion over the Free Exercise Clause protec- 
tion of religion from g~vernment.'~' Meaningful contemporary 
religious liberty under the Free Exercise Clause entails difficult 
choices in the course of application; and this is certainly a sig- 
nificant cost. Sometimes such line drawing will be painful, 
sometimes it will seem unjust, and sometimes it will be errone- 
ous. The alternative neutrality view may avoid these costs, but 
it must be remembered that it does so at the probably greater 
cost of reading out of the Constitution one of its most explicit 
and fundamental rights. '48 
146. Douglas Laycock characterizes this view as a preference for "even-handed 
repression" over "imperfect liberty." Laycock, supra note 5, at 14. 
147. The Establishment Clause retains vigor under the neutrality view. Govern- 
ment cannot discriminate among religions in the granting of assistance or benefits, 
and it cannot discriminate in favor of religion generally by granting it benefits or 
assistance other similar activities or institutions do not receive. Of course this 
creates one major discrimination: the constitutional provision discriminating against 
religion retains vigor and effect; the provision discriminating in favor of religion 
does not. 
Professor Kurland has been the foremost academic proponent of the "neutrality" 
approach, proposing that the clauses be read as a limitation "akin to . . . the 
Equal Protection Clause," prohibiting use of religious classifications "for purposes of 
governmental action, whether that action be the conferring of rights or privileges 
or the imposition of duties or obligations." PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE 
LAW 17-18 (1962) discussed in Pepper, Alternatives, supra note 3, at 346-48. 
148. It is far too easy to forget, or not t o  notice, the simple fact that the "neu- 
trality" approach is hardly neutral or equal in impact. Laws which impinge on 
religious conscience inflict an injury of a quite different kind on the believer than 
the inconvenience or general constraint on liberty that same law inflicts on one 
whose religion is not affeded. Thus neutrality and equality may lie in the eye of 
the beholder, and may depend on whether one looks at the face of a legal provi- 
sion or at the effect on the claimant. For a discussion of similar issues concerning 
the importance of perspective, see Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987). 
Justice Souter makes a similar point in his concurrence this term in the 
Hialeah case. There he states: "Our cases make clear, to look at this from a differ- 
ent perspective, that an exemption for sacramental wine use would not deprive 
Prohibition of neutrality. Rather, 'such an accommodation [would] 'reflect nothing 
more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differ- 
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C. Administrability and Bureaucracy 
Judicial opinions are opaque, particularly to non-lawyers. 
Case law decides a dispute retrospectively based upon a com- 
parison of the facts in the disputed situation with the facts in 
the precedent cases. It applies by analogy; it is law reached by 
deciding which facts were the relevant ones leading to the 
decision in the prior opinion, because rarely are the facts in a 
subsequent situation substantially the same as those in the 
precedent case. Such law is dissimilar from legislation or regu- 
lation because those are usually formulated as discrete rules; 
rules which, on their face at least, are more precise and delim- 
ited. Free exercise jurisprudence is exemplary of this problem. 
The Free Exercise Clause is not a precise or delimited rule 
which on its face can guide the action of governmental actors. 
The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine was complex and subtle, requiring 
simultaneous application of a number of factors and percep- 
tions; it exhibited and demanded flexibility in its application. 
And any doctrine sacient to create a vigorous but workable 
body of free exercise law will be similar, even if it is different 
from Sherbert-Yoder in significant ways. Judicial opinions ap- 
plying and creating free exercise law are unlikely to be simple 
or easy to understand. 
This creates a real danger that the law as applied on a 
day-to-day basis by non-lawyer government actors will be quite 
different from the law as it would be decided by the courts. 
Bureaucracies, through which most government activities oc- 
cur, are particularly unlikely to be flexible, subtle or complex in 
their understanding and application of free exercise doctrine. 
Uniformity and rules-lack of discretion-are their preferred 
mode of operation. Overgeneralization from a judicial decision, 
or series of decisions, is thus a real possibility. A contemporary 
example from Establishment Clause doctrine is instructive: the 
recent cleansing from public school texts of references to and 
discussions of religious subjects149 appears to have occurred, 
at least in signi.fkant part, because of a misunderstanding and 
overextension of Establishment Clause requirements by school 
boards, school administrators, text book committees and text 
ences.' ' " 113 S. Ct. at 2241 n.2 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235 n.22, quoting 
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409). 
149. Paul C. Vitz, Religion and Traditional Values in Public School Textbooks, 
84 PUB. INTEREST 79 (1986); Dent, supra note 73. 
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book publishers.150 This happened despite repeated and ex- 
plicit dicta by the Supreme Court that it  was not required by 
their decisions-repeated statements that studying religion or 
religious material in the context of a secular subject like histo- 
ry or literature was acceptable and that it was religious prac- 
tice (such as prayer) or indoctrination that was unconstitution- 
a1.151 
The extent of this problem varies greatly with different 
factual contexts. For example, the bureaucrats who administer 
driver's licenses are likely to be able to differentiate between 
someone in Mrs. Quaring's position and the claimant hypothe- 
sized above whose religious beliefs prohibit use of any driver's 
license a t  all or any formal substitute. And in the Bob Jones 
situation, IRS agents are more likely to have the training (and 
the skepticism) to apply a pro free exercise decision in a flexi- 
ble and subtle way than are other  bureaucrat^.'^^ Given the 
subtleties and charged feelings in the school situation, school 
officials, as the Establishment Clause example suggests, may 
be more likely to misunderstand and overgeneralize. 
In Mozert u. Hawkins County Public Schools,153 funda- 
mentalist parents claimed that imposition of a particular basic 
reading series in public school was a violation of their free 
150. The causes of this phenomenon are probably complex, and would be an 
important subject for empirical research. Mixed with misunderstanding of Supreme 
Court doctrine may well be (1) a preference to avoid even coming near the consti- 
tutional line, (2) a preference for an  excuse to avoid the sensitive and controversial 
questions of religion in public education, and (3) a bias that religion is appropriate 
in the private realm and inappropriate in the public realm. This, of course, would 
be in accord with the Enlightenment view of religion and with the dominant mod- 
ern secular intellectual paradigm. See Dent, supra note 73, at 867-73; Pepper, 
Takings, supra note 37, at 306-07. For an argument that religion is inappropriate 
in the public realm, see Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, supra note 117, 
which contains references to some of the current writing on that question. 
151. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968); Abington Township 
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 
US. 203, 235-36 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
152. This may be over-optimistic given the IRS' initially slow and ineffective 
response to the Universal Life Church claims of tax exemption for their "churches." 
See Universal Life Church v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Cal. 1974); 
Note, Mail Order Ministries, the Religious Purpose Exemption, and the Constitution, 
33 TAX LAW. 959 (1979-80); Stephen Schwartz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: 
When Should the Church Render unto Caesar, 29 FLA. L. REV. 50, 62 m.81 & 82 
(1976); see also Heins, "Other People's Faiths": The Scientology Litigation and the 
Justiciability of Religious Fraud, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153 (1981). 
153. 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
The facts, the two opinions, and the basic issues the case raised are explored in 
detail in Stolzenberg, supra note 49, at  581. 
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exercise rights because of the content of many of the readings. 
The federal district court in a careful and nuanced application 
of the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine agreed, and ordered that the 
students be exempted from reading class and allowed to receive 
home instruction in reading. The judge was well aware of the 
potential for overgeneralization: 
While the Court must be sensitive to the widespread 
implications of its decisions, it must also limit its decisions to 
the facts of the case before it . . . . 
This opinion shall not be interpreted to require the 
school system to make this option available to any other per- 
son or to these plaintiffs for any other subject. Further accom- 
modations, if they must be made, will have to be made on a 
case-by-case basis by the teachers, school administrators, 
Board, and Department of Education . . . .I5' 
The court's attempt at care notwithstanding, this would seem 
to  be exactly the kind of widely publicized decision likely to  be 
misunderstood and overgeneralized by administrators, bureau- 
crats, elected public officials (such as school board members) 
and parents, most of whom are far more likely to  hear of and 
be influenced by the decision than to have read the opinion. 
The defendants and many commentators in the media were 
concerned that such a decision would cause crippling adminis- 
trative problems for many public schools. As written it probably 
would not have; but as misunderstood by a large segment of 
relevant actors, as it might well have been, it could have led to  
significant problems of over-application. 
This is a genuine concern for courts elaborating free exer- 
cise doctrine, and may explain some of the inconsistency in 
application of the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine.ls5 It is the kind of 
concern that might underlie a preference for the neutrality 
approach discussed in the section above, for avoiding distinc- 
tions in application makes the doctrine much simpler. Sherbert 
was the law for over twenty-five years, however, and I know of 
154. 647 F. Supp. at 1202-03. 
155. In United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), for example, the Court's ap- 
parent failure to follow the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine may have stemmed from con- 
cern that an opinion dealing with the narrow situation of the Amish and social 
security tax might be misunderstood as applying to taxes in general, including 
income taxes. The opinion may also be based on the related concern that religion 
based exemptions from taxation are more likely to create sincerity and fraud prob- 
lems than are exemptions from other governmental regulations. For a discussion of 
Lee, see Pepper, Conundrum, supm note 3, at 299-302. 
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no serious problems that have been caused by overgeneraliza- 
tion in app1i~ation.l~~ It is possible, of course, that  such ef- 
fects have occurred, because I also know of no studies of the 
effect of modern free exercise doctrine on decisions outside the 
courts. Because a doctrine providing for robust exemptions 
under the Free Exercise Clause goes against the grain of the 
dominan t  secu la r  in te l lec tua l  parad igm,  however,  
overgeneralization may be much less of a threat here than it 
was with application of the Establishment Clause to the public 
schools, where the doctrine tended to go with the grain rather 
than against it.15' 
D. Timidity, Limits and Possibility 
Even during the Sherbert-Yoder era, the decisions of the 
Supreme Court in favor of religious exemptions concerned, for 
the most part, matters not of major significance from the 
government's point of view. A few more persons qualifying for 
unemployment insurance,'" or accommodating a few welfare 
recipients who refuse to use a social security number,'" are 
hardly issues of general imp~r tance . '~~  Yoder, of course, is the 
clear exception given the importance of education. But even in 
that case the consequences were distinctly circumscribed by the 
insular, limited nature of the Amish community and way of 
life. And the Court went out of its way-to an  almost bizarre 
e x t e n t t o  clearly indicate that the holding was limited to the 
circumstances of the Ami~h.'~' Had the case been likely to 
have more generalized consequences for mandatory public edu- 
cation systems, it is unlikely it would have been decided as it 
156. At least in the courts, quite the contrary was the case. Plaintiffs asserting 
freedom of religion claims tended to lose. James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407 
(1992); see also Pepper, Conundrum, supra note 3. 
157. See supra note 150. 
158. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employ- 
ment Sec., 489 US. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
Comm'n, 480 US. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707 (1981). 
159. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
160. That they are not issues of major consequence does not mean that they are 
not of great importance to the individuals involved, or that how the state treats 
such individuals is not itself of major importance. Here I am addressing the conse- 
quences, from the state's point of view, of accommodating these individuals in the 
particular contexts in which the Court has held it was rewired by the Free Exer- 
cise Clause. 
161. Pepper, Alternatives, supra note 3, at 333-45. 
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was.l'j2 
Thus, even under the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine, protection 
for religion has been held required only in areas of marginal 
concern to the state. The lower courts have ranged significantly 
further than the Supreme Court, as the Mozert trial court opin- 
ion shows, but timidity is present in those courts as well, as 
exemplified by the circuit court's overturning of that very deci- 
sion? In this area there seems to be a distinct disinclination 
on the part of the courts to constrain government in any way 
that has major consequences. The timidity may be due in part 
to concern that the freedom has no limits (as the language in 
the Clause has no limits), a concern that giving the Clause real 
power may start the law down a slippery slope. I have suggest- 
ed elsewhere several limits to constrain the freedom within 
manageable bounds, limits which would make incursions into 
significant governmental interests quite modest, yet yield sub- 
stantial areas of freedom from government imposition for reli- 
giously motivated c ~ n d u c t . ' ~  A coherent, limited doctrine 
which gives real power to the Free Exercise Clause can be 
constructed without undue difficulty. It will not be easy to 
apply-painful and problematic choices will have to be 
made-but it can be created with relatively minor additions to 
and modifications of the basic ideas underlying Sherbert and 
Yoder. 
Instead of focusing on relatively narrow limits, however, 
consider for a moment what would happen if the courts were 
less timid, if the limits were more capacious. If Bob Jones Uni- 
versity had maintained its tax exemption, would a great deal in 
our society change? There might be some incentive for fraudu- 
lent claims of religious belief to give shelter for racial discrimi- 
nation in education, but both the IRS and our courts are suffi- 
ciently competent at sifting truth from falsehood that no large 
social change or damage is likely to ensue. More difficult is the 
Reynolds case. Could our society tolerate-make room for-a 
group with a significantly different understanding of the nature 
of something so fundamental as marriage? What would the 
consequences have been of islands of polygamy within a gener- 
al rule of law mandating monogamy? Would the legal require- 
162. Pepper, Altemtiues, supra note 3, at 344. 
163. Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Sch., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). Sever- 
al lower court decisions are examined in Pepper, Conundrum, supm note 3, at 265. 
164. See Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at 325-35 
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ment of monogamy tend to change because of the demands of 
equality? Would the social fabric change in any important way? 
Would the non-legal forces toward conformity have led the 
Mormon church to repudiate polygamy in any case? 
What would be the consequences of a constitutional rule 
that shelters some fundamentally different ways of living? This 
stretches the imagination. The direction it moves one's thought 
is interesting: perhaps a society more genuinely diverse than 
ours; perhaps a tolerance level of a different order; perhaps 
pluralism in things that matter; perhaps space created in the 
interstices of the bureaucratic state for communities and com- 
munal values to come into being and grow.lB5 And perhaps 
there are rather darker possibilities to imagine as well.lB6 
To return to the question of equality: would it be fair, as- 
suming such a leavening could occur in our legal regime, for 
the space to be available only to those with religious motiva- 
tion, only to those who form religious communities? The inter- 
pretation and arguments elaborated above suggest that the 
answer is clearly "yes." If you are inclined toward a %o" an- 
swer, however, at least two thoughts should be considered. 
First, the good of such an open, diverse polity may be worth the 
cost of that unfairness. And, second, this strong equality incli- 
nation (which is what the perception of unfairness must be 
based upon) may have a sort of hydraulic effect: granting sig- 
nificant liberty for religion might over time initiate a dynamic 
leading t o  the creation of other areas of constitutional liberty. 
The definition of religion might enlarge over time to create 
such liberty;16' or other parts of the Constitution might be 
165. In this regard it is interesting to note that in the last decade two of the 
"Forewords" to the Harvard Law Review's annual Supreme Court issue have been 
based on Free Exercise Clause cases, but have been concerned with far broader 
matters. See Cover, supra note 41; Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self- 
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986). Each seems to have been imagining a 
legal regime with more room for difference, with significant legal space for commu- 
nity. Imagining a Free Exercise Clause taken seriously leads in this direction. 
166. See Stephen Pepper, The Case of the Human Sacrifice, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 
897 (1981), for some imagining along these lines testing the outer limits of freedom 
of religion. See also Stanley Hauerwas, Self-Sacrifwe as Demonic: A Theological 
Response to Jonestown, in VIOLENCE AND RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF
JIM JONES'S PEOPLE'S TEMPLE MOVEMENT (Ken Levi ed., 1982), for a discussion of 
the Jim Jones tragedy. The recent debacle involving the Branch Davidians in 
Waco, Texas, is another reminder of the violent possibilities involved in religious 
freedom. 
167. William Marshall argues that my earlier expression of such a possibility 
means that he and I essentially agree on the equality view. Marshall, The Case 
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their source, as has occurred with the substantive due process 
rights of "privacy."168 
Two hundred years ago religion was recognized as a legiti- 
mate source of non-governmental authority; it was a rival to 
the state. The religion clauses recognize that fact. Now, quite 
far removed from that recognition, do we reduce religion to all 
other human motivations, generally subordinate to law and 
government? Or do we take the Constitution's guaranty of 
religious freedom seriously, interpreting the First Amendment 
to shelter significant areas of conduct, perhaps hoping that 
such protection might over time generalize to  other related, but 
non-religious, motivations? Do we interpret the Constitution to  
expand or contract individual liberty and intermediate commu- 
nity power? Text, history, structure, prudence and precedent all 
support a vigorous understanding of freedom of religion. There 
are risks and difficulties with the interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause suggested here, but the promise appears great- 
er than the threat. 
Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, at 402-03, commenting on Pepper, 
Taking, supra note 37, at 331-32. I believe this is incorrect. In the absence of the 
development of an expanded definition of religion, it is clear to me that the Free 
Exercise Clause ought to be interpreted to shelter religious conduct as traditionally 
understood. This includes the peyote usage in Smith, the polygamy in ReywZds 
(depending upon the outcome of something like the Sherbert-Yoder "compelling 
interest" test), and the parents' claim in Yoder, situations where I believe Marshall 
would not now find the Free Exercise Clause providing shelter. For me, the expan- 
sion of the definition of religion is quite secondary to the issue of reading the Free 
Exercise Clause as shelter from otherwise valid law. For Marshall, the definitional 
issue would be primary, the expansion would have to occur ,before he would read 
the Clause as providing protection for conduct beyond speech. See Marshall, Free 
Exercise as Free Expression, supra note 6, a t  587-88 & n.214. For discussions of 
defining religion under the First Amendment see Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Reli- 
gion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. IU. L. REV. 579; Kent Greenawalt, Religion 
as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753 (1984); Pepper, AZtem- 
tives, supra note 3, at 353-64, and sources cited in those articles. 
168. See TRIBE, supra note 33, at ch. 15. 
